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Introduction 
The illustration on the title page of this thesis was created by the Jewish artist Eran Shakine. The drawing, 
entitled A Muslim, a Christian and a Jew in the Tunnel of Love, was part of the exhibition A Muslim, a 
Christian and a Jew at the Jewish Museum in Berlin, on display until March of this year.1 We discern a 
tunnel, and three people walking in its darkness: aided by the subscription we know they are a Muslim, 
a Christian and a Jew. The persons are all wearing similar outfits, and stereotyping is absent: we are not 
able to discern who is who, we ‘only’ see three human beings. When we take a closer look, we notice 
that they are not walking in complete darkness. The three of them are holding something in their hands: 
a flashlight with which they illuminate the tunnel – the ‘tunnel of love’. What message does Shakine 
want to convey with this drawing? Could it be this: both the Muslim, the Christian and the Jew possess 
and emanate their own ray of light, and, when lifepaths are shared and lights are combined, the initially 
dark and frightening tunnel is transformed into a tunnel of light and love? Moreover, might we assume 
that, through this process of enlightenment, the blindness by hatred is ended and the men are able to 
truly see each other as they are: beings like oneself, and sharing in human dignity?2  
Shakine’s drawing is an intriguing piece of art and forms a good introduction to my thesis in which I 
investigate the positions on Nazism taken by Egyptian nationalist intellectuals Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and Sayyid 
Quṭb. In this study, I wonder whether we can figuratively discern these intellectuals in the artwork: 
would Ḥusayn and Quṭb be willing to play the role of ‘a Muslim’ in the drawing: walking through the 
tunnel of Abrahamitic love, side by side with ‘a Jew’, sharing in humanity and dignity? Moreover, would 
Ḥusayn and Quṭb continue walking next to their Jewish companion in his darkest night, the Holocaust, 
kindling a fire and lighting his path? Or does tunnel vision prevent them from finding the tunnel of love 
and thus their Jewish brother? 
In order to answer this research question, I will first explore the historical context of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and 
Sayyid Quṭb: their attitude towards Jews and their response to Nazism didn’t take place in a historical 
                                                             
1 Jewish Museum Berlin. Eran Shakine. A Muslim, a Christian and a Jew, 2016, oil paint stick on canvas, consulted 
on the 2nd of May 2017 on <https://www.jmberlin.de/en/eran-shakine>. 
2 This assumption seems to be correct, since Shakine himself says about the whole of his exhibition in an 
interview: ‘The three similar figures, their religious background unidentifiable, create situations by means of a 
vivid and comical body language. (…) The three heroes, dressed as 19th century gentlemen, help each other in 
their journey to find the love of God. Here, there are no stereotypes, no one is the laughingstock, everyone is the 
same; we see three human beings who explore life, nature, culture and philosophy, out of shared curiosity, 
without trying to prove each other wrong.’ Lersh, G. “I don’t laugh about religion. I laugh about human 
behaviour. An Interview with Eran Shakine”, 27th of October 2016, consulted on the 2nd of May 2017 on 
<http://www.jmberlin.de/blog-en/2016/10/interview-shakine/>. 
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vacuum. In the following chapter, I will therefore examine where ‘the tunnel’ is to be found: what did 
their Egypt – the Egypt between the two revolutions of 1919 and 1952 – look like, politically, 
economically and socially, and which challenges did Egypt face at the time? Great Britain and her 
decreasing control over Egypt will prove to be the most relevant historical event for the period under 
discussion, which will be elaborated upon in the historical overview below. It will become evident that 
the main question of the time was: How was Egypt to be redefined and reconstructed after gaining 
independence?  
In the process of redefining Egypt nationalists have developed various visions and plans. In chapters two 
and three we will become acquainted with two of these nationalists: Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and Sayyid Quṭb 
respectively. By exploring their own, as well as relevant secondary writings, we will explore who they 
were, how they lived their lives, what they found important, and how they saw the future of culture in 
Egypt. It will become clear that Ḥusayn and Quṭb, both children from the Egyptian village and travellers 
to the West, formulated very divergent answers to the question regarding Egypt’s identity: whereas one 
intellectual saw the light at the end of the tunnel in Egypt’s embrace of the West, the other turned his 
back on the West and found in Islam the only remedy against the darkness in Egypt and the rest of the 
world. Additionally, I will demonstrate that the intellectuals under discussion held very different views 
regarding the Abrahamitic tunnel of love, and Nazi ideology.  
In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I will explore whether we can discover a link between the 
positions on nationalism and Nazism taken by Ḥusayn and Quṭb. In other words, does their particular 
redefinition of Egypt lead them, through the tunnel, directly to the other end, i.e. a particular response 
to Nazism? Or is the path not necessarily as straight as we might think it to be? 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Egypt between the Revolutions (1919-1952) 
1.1 Historical overview 
World War I and Egypt’s first Revolution 
In November 1914, Great Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire. One month later, a protectorate 
over Egypt was proclaimed, by which Britain put an end to her ‘Veiled Protectorate’ over Egypt, which 
had lasted for 32 years, and to four hundred years of Ottoman over-lordship.3  Before 1914, the British 
had ruled through the khedive of Egypt (i.e. the viceroy of the Ottoman Sultan) and his ministers. Now 
khedive Abbās II was dethroned and Ḥusayn Kāmil was appointed as the new sultan (in 1917 he was 
succeeded by his brother Aḥmad Fu’ād I). Sir Reginald Wingate was appointed high commissioner: the 
British representative of Egypt at the time.4  
The Egyptians however were seething with discontent with their foreign rulers and local nationalist 
movements striving for independence gained much popularity.5 
On November 13, 1918, two days after the signing of the armistice (i.e. the formal end of the First World 
War), high commissioner Wingate was visited by politician and nationalist Sa‘d Zaghlūl and two other 
former members of the defunct Legislative Assembly. The three politicians informed Wingate that it was 
they and not the British government that were to be seen as the true representatives of the Egyptian 
people. Therefore they demanded autonomy for Egypt. Zaghlūl declared his intention of leading a wafd 
(delegation) to negotiate the termination of the Protectorate.6 He and his wafd (which organized itself 
as a political party only in 1923) gained much popularity among the Egyptians, and the British 
government’s refusal to receive the delegation and arrest of Zaghlūl caused an enormous revolt. 
Noticing the social unrest caused by these nationalists, the British exiled Zaghlūl and his associates to 
Malta in March 1919, which triggered widespread disorder, including demonstrations, boycotts and 
violence: an estimated 800 Egyptians died in confrontations with Egyptian police and British troops.7 
This led ultimately to Egypt’s first modern revolution – the moment in time that forms the official 
starting point of this study.8 General Edmund Allenby, the victor over the Ottomans in Palestine who 
                                                             
3 Whidden, J. Monarchy and Modernity in Egypt. Politics, Islam and Neo-Colonialism Between the Wars (London, 
2013), 13. 
4 Idem, 14. 
5 New World Encyclopedia, Egypt. 
6 Whidden, 14. 
7 Idem, 16. 
8 Idem, 15. 
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replaced High commissioner Wingate, insisted on concessions to the nationalists to appease the 
Egyptian public. Zaghlūl was released and next led his delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, 
where he met with very little success. In Egypt, however, he had become the leader of the nation and 
the man of the people.9 Later that year, Zaghlūl and Lord Milner, the British colonial secretary, talked 
about the future relationship between Great Britain and Egypt, as a consequence of the disorder in 
Egypt. A declaration of independence was eventually signed on February 28, 1922.  
Sultan Fu’ād I was crowned king on March 15, 1922. The new Egyptian government, founded in 1923 
and based on the parliamentary representative system, drafted a new constitution. Zaghlūl was elected 
Prime Minister of Egypt in 1924. The kingdom would last till 1952.  
Although the declaration of independence signed in 1922 officially ended the British protectorate, four 
matters were still left in British hands: the security of imperial communications, the defence of Egypt, 
the protection of foreign interests and of minorities, and the Sudan.10  
In 1936 king Fu’ād I was succeeded by his son Farūq I, who would reign over Egypt till 1952 (the year of 
the second Revolution). In August that year, the long awaited and highly demanded Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty was signed in Switzerland. It officially brought an end to the British occupation, but in reality 
Egypt was still not granted full independence: in the 1936 Treaty, a twenty-year alliance was agreed 
upon, which allowed Britain to maintain armed forces on Egyptian territory both in peace and war (with 
a maximum of 10.000 men) and which obliged Britain to defend Egypt from invasion and provide the 
Egyptian army with equipment and technical assistance when necessary. Additionally it was accorded 
that, after a transitional period, the capitulations (i.e. the extraterritorial legal system for foreigners) 
were to be abolished.11 
As for the social atmosphere in the interbellum, Egypt in the twenties was relatively prosperous. Typical 
for this decade was also the mainstream desire amongst the Egyptian intellectuals to become a modern 
society, through modernization processes. One should note that modernization at the time was seen as 
westernization: the ultimate goal for Egypt was to become similar to Europe. Europe was imitated in all 
                                                             
9 Whidden, 16. 
10 Marlowe, J. A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations. 1800-1956 (Hamden, 1965), 302. As for 
the question of the Sudan: since the early 19th century, nationalists of all stripes strived for Egyptian sovereignty 
over the Sudan. Great Britain separated the countries after the Sudan’s reconquest in 1896-1898. The Sudan was 
a constant subject of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, until independence of the Sudan was granted in the 1950s 
(Gershoni, Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 110, 111).  
11 Marlowe, 300. Regarding the Sudan: both parties agreed that ‘the primary aim of their administration in the 
Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese’ (ibid.). Practically it meant that Egyptian as well as British troops 
were to defend the Sudan, and that Egyptian immigration to the Sudan was to be unlimited (ibid.). 
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facets of life, both materially (copying Western technology, economic institutions and political 
structures) and spiritually (customs, values and mentality).12  
At the start of the twentieth century a new group of intellectuals, the effendiyya, arose, who embodied 
this modern Egypt: a large group of westernized, Egyptian intellectuals, who were educated in 
westernized educational systems. This group originated from the educated middle and upper classes13 
and was visually recognizable by their European-style clothing: trousers, jacket, and Fez (tarbush in 
Arabic). 
In the 1930s however, things changed. As a consequence of the educational developments of the time, 
a new and larger urban, literate, and therefore also a nationally involved class developed in Egypt, 
termed ‘the new effendiyya’. This group is described as ‘a broad social stratum of urban, literate, 
modern occupational groups’, originating from the middle and lower classes, and from less westernized 
social backgrounds. Particularly among this group of new effendiyya, who experienced Egyptian life as 
‘an unsuccessful patchwork’ of European values and native Egyptian traditions,14 a new urge developed 
in the process of ‘redefining Egypt’. Modernization – aside from a few exceptions – was no longer 
regarded as a synonym for Westernization as the ultimate goal that one was striving to achieve.15  
Why this change of view? After European ideologies such as liberalism and nationalism had been met 
with a positive response in the twenties, relations with Britain were stretched to a breaking point in the 
thirties, for the Revolution of 1919 had still not achieved Egyptian independence. The West was 
regarded as an aggressive, imperialist civilization, whose only goal was domination.16  
Another internal factor that contributed to the change of outlook was the economic depression of the 
early 1930s, with severe social ramifications: the industrial employment boom, which was unleashed by 
the First World War, collapsed with the war’s end, and the world economic crises of 1929, the Great 
                                                             
12 Gershoni, I., Jankowski, J. P. Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945 (Cambridge, 2002), 38. The 
educational system was a means of modernization and thus westernization. In the interwar period, a state 
educational system had come into being, parallel to the religious educational system stationed in al-Azhar. This 
meant: a new professional class. In the state-controlled school system many Egyptian youngsters were 
socialized. The curriculum of this system consisted mostly of non-traditional, Western-derived, modern subjects. 
In the Egyptian University, the same Western emphasis could be found: ‘with its French academic structure, 
largely European teaching staff, and Western subject-matter usually presented in European languages, the 
“Egyptian” University in its early years was only nominally an Egyptian institution’ (idem, 17).  
13 Idem, 11, 216. As for the occupation of the effendiyya: the term effendi applied to a large range of groups – 
students in the Western-style schools, higher institutes, the Egyptian University, but also civil servants in the 
bureaucracy and teachers in the modern educational system (idem).  
14 Idem, 6. 
15 Idem, 51. There were effendis who kept on spreading Western ideas, and combatting the anti-Western 
feelings. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn will prove to be one of these exceptions. Other examples are: Salāma Mūsā, Ḥusayn Fawzī, 
’Ismā‘īl Aḥmad Adhām, Amīr Buqtur, and Amīn al-Khūlī (idem, 51). 
16 Idem, 213, 214. 
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Depression, exacerbated the already tense situation. The world price of cotton, Egypt’s most important 
export product, dropped between 1928 and 1931 from 26 to 10 dollars per unit.17 All Egyptian exports 
are estimated to have declined by one-third in value, which was reflected in Egyptian living conditions.18 
Furthermore, politically, there was a loss of faith in the parliamentary and Western-derived order 
erected in the 1920s:19 the thirties was a decade of political unrest, polarization, and violence. For 
example, when ’Ismā‘īl Ṣidqī was appointed prime minister in 1930, he ‘dismissed the Wafdist-
controlled parliament, abrogated the Constitution of 1923, introduced a more autocratic replacement 
in its stead, and rigged the elections of early 1931 to obtain a pliant parliamentary majority.’20 In 1935, 
massive and violent student demonstrations took place, and the restoration of the Constitution of 1923 
was forced. When the Wafd returned to office, the party was weakened due to internal schism, 
opposition from its parliamentary rivals, violence between its supporters and its opponents, and a 
tarnished image due to conflicts with King Farūq.21 An external political factor was the crisis of 
democracy in Europe in the thirties, which eroded the popularity of the European model.22 
This poor social, economic and political situation caused a widespread mood of disillusionment, in 
contrast to the spirit of optimism that prevailed in the preceding decade caused by the first Revolution 
and the attainment of independence. Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski rightfully conclude in their 
book Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945: ‘The operational impotence of the Wafd vis-à-vis the 
Palace and the British; the inability of the electoral system to reflect popular wishes; the elite-dominated 
and self-serving nature of parliament; the factionalism and corruption of the country’s political parties; 
the manifest inequalities of the socio-economic order – all these indicated the failure of the new 
Egyptian state to achieve its proclaimed goals of independence, modernity, and progress. The utopian 
expectations that the Revolution of 1919 had heralded the inauguration of a new era of freedom, 
prosperity, and national revival came crashing down under the dual impact of depressions and 
repression.’23 In conclusion, the new effendiyya found that redefining Egypt after her independence 
should take place by a route other than imitation of the West. 
‘Redefining the Egyptian nation’ 
Different nationalist ‘redefinitions’ of the Egyptian nation have been given by the effendiyya living 
between the Revolutions – by both ‘the old’ and ‘the new’. In surveying the many nationalist utterances 
                                                             
17 Küntzel, M. Jihad and Jew-Hatred. Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11 (New York, 2007), 8. 
18 Gershoni, Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Idem, 2. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Idem, 213, 214. 
23 Idem, 3. 
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of the time, Gershoni and Jankowski make a very useful categorization concerning these utterances. 
They distinguish between two main categories: the territorial nationalism of the 1920s, and the supra-
Egyptian nationalism of the decades thereafter.  
The territorial nationalism of the 1920s was the type of nationalism that achieved dominance in Egypt 
directly after the first Revolution, originating among the Westernized elite, the effendiyya, who strove 
to reconstruct the Egyptian society on a Western model. The Western ideas of liberalism, secularism 
and science, as well as the European model of the nation-state were admired by them and taken as the 
basis of their image of ‘the new Egypt.’24  
As the term already supposes, territorial nationalism was territorially orientated. Gershoni and 
Jankowski note: ‘This outlook was based on the revivification of the Egyptian ethnie as it had emerged 
and had been shaped into a unique national community by the particular environment and the 
distinctive history of the people living in the Nile valley.’25 Egypt’s geographical location and ancient 
history thus determine the definition of Egypt; these define her national identity. Moreover, ‘a natural 
bond between the East and the West was presumed by territorial nationalists’; the link generally being 
‘the Pharaonic past and/or the Greco-Roman legacy.’26  
The idea behind this form of nationalism was that one could struggle politically against Britain and the 
West yet simultaneously draw from its culture in the process of nation-building.27 Territorial nationalists 
found their way out of tradition, as embodied in Arab cultural legacy and historic Muslim community, 
and linked Egypt to her ‘natural’ milieu of the Mediterranean and the West. By doing so, these 
nationalists harmonized their wish for the preservation of Egypt’s authentic identity, and their desire to 
modernize the country and to adapt to rapidly changing, modern conditions.28   
The second category of nationalism is supra-Egyptian nationalism, which developed in the thirties and 
forties. The new effendiyya was the key group in the development of this style of nationalism.29 
                                                             
24 Gershoni, Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 214. 
25 Idem, 212. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Idem, 214.  
28 Gershoni, I., & Jankowski, J. P. Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930 
(New York, 1986), 271. The writers describe how the constitution of the 1920s, the parliament, the country’s 
ministries and bureaucracy, the daily operations of the government, the activities of the new political parties, 
the foreign policy of the Egyptian state, the economic relationships with the region and the world, and even the 
educational program, all reflected this orientation of nationalism, whereby Egypt was considered to be separate 
and remote from the backward Islamic, Arab, and Eastern worlds, and close to the dynamic and progressive 
West (ibid.). 
29 Gershoni, Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 216. 
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Since the late 19th century, a distinction between the East (Asia and Africa) and the West (Europe and 
its colonial outliers) had been accepted by various thinkers. From the 1930s onwards, however, this 
dichotomy between East and West took on a new quality: the differences separating the two civilizations 
were highlighted, and the conflict between them became the norm.30 The new effendiyya, coming from 
the rural communities of Egypt full of anti-imperialist and anti-British sentiments, believed that it was 
impossible and incorrect to struggle against Western domination while at the same time trying to absorb 
its culture31: creating a new Egypt focussing on these dysfunctional and inauthentic Western and archaic 
Pharaonic ideas was unthinkable.  
Because the new effendiyya was directly affected by the expansion of literacy at the time, the members 
of this group could now acquaint themselves directly with the holy religious scriptures and make the 
‘shared scripturalist version of religion a marker of their collective self-definition.’32 They stressed that 
Islam is a universal religion, irrespective of geographical location, state structures, racial considerations 
or class differences. ‘Neither time nor place affected Islam’s validity.’33 The supra-Egyptianists believed 
that Egypt’s meaningful history didn’t start with the pre-Islamic pharaoh’s or the Greeks and Romans, 
as the territorialists believed, but with the entry of Islam into the Nile Valley.34 This start of history, i.e. 
the birth of Islam, was an Arab history, thus for supra-Egyptianists there was a close connection between 
Islam and Arabism. These nationalists therefore didn’t believe in a unique Egyptian national personality, 
but in the unity of the Arab nation, for Egypt shared her Islamic-Arab heritage with peoples outside the 
Nile Valley.  
The meaning of the 1919 Revolution for supra-Egyptianists was this: the Revolution is an expression of 
a general Muslim revolution against the West – parallel to similar revolts in Iraq, Syria, Palestine, North 
Africa, and elsewhere: ‘The umma as a whole was rising to throw off the Western yoke, to recover its 
lost independence, and to return to a golden age of unity and splendour similar to that which had 
obtained at the start of its history.’35 
                                                             
30 Gershoni, Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 37. 
31 Idem, 215. 
32 Idem, 216. 
33 Idem, 79. 
34 Idem, 88. 
35 Idem, 90. Gershoni and Jankowski divide this second category of supra-Egyptian nationalism into three 
subcategories: (1) Egyptian Islamic nationalism, (2) integral Egyptian nationalism and (3) Egyptian Arab 
nationalism. Egyptian Islamic nationalism attempted to build a religiously based alternative to supplant the 
territorial nationalism of the twenties (idem, 79). Integral Egyptian nationalists drew their inspiration mostly 
from pessimistic schools of modern European thought (especially from the Italian and German fascist versions), 
worshiped power and had a populist, anti-Western tone (idem, 98, 99, 107). Islam for integral nationalists was a 
religion that proved to be congruent with the Egyptian, strong and militant character (idem, 114). Egyptian Arab 
nationalists primarily discussed national identity in cultural terms. Egypt’s ‘Arabness’, her Arab language, and her 
Arab history, are highlighted by these nationalists. They believed that the whole Arab region was a unity and that 
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World War II 
In 1939-1945, a second war was waged: World War II had not only devastating consequences for 
Europe, but also immediate repercussions for Egyptian political life. Although Egypt maintained 
neutrality until 1945 (when the country officially declared war on the Axis powers),36 directly in 1939 
the Egyptian government severed relations with Germany, declared a state of siege and imposed strict 
censorship on the press. The latter especially affected movements displaying anti-British inclinations, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Full martial law was proclaimed in 1940.37 In that same year Britain 
pressured the Egyptian king to form a government that was more supportive of the British case than 
the Aḥmad Māhir-ministry that was governing at the time. Also in 1940, Italy invaded Egypt from Libya. 
Two years later, in 1942, Germany invaded the country: Nazi Germany’s General Erwin Rommel with his 
German and Italian Afrika Korps penetrated Egypt till al-Alamayn, only a hundred kilometres west of 
Alexandria. There, he and his troops were finally stopped by the British Lieutenant General Bernard 
Montgomery and his army in November 1942.38  
Earlier that year, before Nazi Germany’s invasion, a well-known British political intervention was 
executed in Egypt, later known as ‘the February 4th incident’. On this date the British authorities in Egypt 
forced king Farūq I to install a Wafdist ministry and accept Muṣṭafā al-Naḥḥās as its new Prime Minister. 
The British believed that by putting a Wafd- government in place, this party would be able to tone down 
the pro-Axis sentiments that seemed to exist around the king. Furthermore they reckoned that the Wafd 
would be able to gain the support of the Egyptian masses to choose the British side in the war. So the 
British army surrounded the Palace in Cairo, and an ultimatum was given to the king: abdication of the 
throne, or a government corresponding to British demands. Farūq I ‘chose’ the second option, and a 
government according to British demands was formed. The incident caused the tarnishing of image of 
both the king and the Wafd, for they both had cooperated with the foreign occupiers. A further 
disillusionment of many Egyptians with the existing order was the inevitable result. 
A revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was deeply wished for by the Egyptians after World War 
II, meaning a complete evacuation of British troops from Egypt and the ending of British control in the 
Sudan. Negotiations with Britain, undertaken by the new Prime Minister Maḥmūd Fahmī al-Nuqrāshī 
                                                             
dividing it into Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian and other categories that fragmentized the Arab world, was the negative 
and artificial result of imperialism. Only a return to Arab unity would lead to an Egyptian revival. 
36 Why didn’t Egypt, standing under British rule, declare war on Germany right away, one could ask. Egypt not 
doing so was a strategy to extract political concessions from Great Britain. ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Azzām, minister of 
Social Affairs, suggested a list of requirements which should be implemented by the British (such as the ‘support 
for the aspiration of the Egyptian people concerning Arab unity’), in exchange for Egyptian entry into the war 
(Gershoni, Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 199). 
37 Idem, 192. 
38 Krämer, G. The Jews in Modern Egypt, 1914-1952 (Seattle, 1989), 156. 
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and (and after February 1946 by his successor ’Ismā‘īl Ṣidqī), didn’t succeed, because Britain refused to 
grant the Sudan independence. The case was even brought to the United Nations in 1947, but this didn’t 
resolve the situation.   
Since the Wafd, formerly known for their struggle against occupying Britain, was seen by the new 
effendiyya as being in cahoots with the West after the February 4th Incident, other radical alternatives 
were preferred by the new social class: politics was passing into the hands of radicals, the most 
important and popular radical movement being the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by members 
of the new effendiyya.39 This movement was considered to be more authentic than the moderate 
parties, and their reformist character was much more appreciated by the Egyptian masses.40 Meanwhile 
the Wafd, in need of a rehabilitation of its image, looked for new directions in its political strategy, 
resulting in the wish for an institutionalized Arab cooperation. After many negotiations in 1943 and 1944 
by the Wafd, the League of Arab States was established in Cairo in 1945, with Egypt playing a leading 
role41: an ‘Egyptian triumph’.42  
‘The Palestine-problem’ 
Meanwhile, from 1936 onwards, Egypt had become nationally involved in ‘the Palestine problem’, 
backing the Arabs in Palestine. The Arab Revolts that took place in Palestine from 1936 till 193943 were 
front-page news in the major Egyptian newspapers, with a strong sympathy for the Palestinian Arab 
position.44 The Muslim Brotherhood, who called for Egyptian support for the Palestinian Arabs from the 
start of the revolt, gained much popularity at that time, and stepped up its radical and violent activities. 
Protests and mass demonstrations were organized to point out to the British their ‘atrocities’ in 
Palestine: appeals were made to the Egyptian government to involve itself in defence of the Palestinian 
Arab cause, and from 1938 onwards, the Muslim Brotherhood asked publicly for volunteers to join the 
Palestinians in their jihad against the British.45 In the last years of the 1930s, the Palestine question ‘had 
                                                             
39 These ‘radicals’ (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), can be characterized by their fierce activism, their 
insistence on Egyptian authenticity, their call for Muslims to reverse the un-Islamic course of recent history, their 
wish to reinvigorate the traditional Muslim mores within Egypt and their defence of the status of Muslims 
throughout the world. Young Egypt, although being a popular secular society, demonstrated the same spirit 
(Gershoni, Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 19). As for the Brotherhood, Küntzel gives some figures: 
The Brotherhood’s membership rose from 800 members in 1936 to being at the peak of its power in 1948 with a 
million members and sympathisers. It had developed into a state within a state; with its own factories, weapons, 
schools, hospitals and military units (Küntzel, 9, 54).  
40 Gershoni, Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 195. 
41 Idem, 197. 
42 Idem, 210. 
43 The Arab Revolts were nationalist revolts by Palestinian Arabs against the British and their Palestine Mandate, 
in order to achieve Arab independence and the end of Jewish immigration which, due to the German Reich, had 
risen greatly (Küntzel, 25).  
44 Gershoni, Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 168. 
45 Idem, 180-183. 
  13 
become a matter of wide and deep concern in Egypt.’46 The Egyptian government, which had refrained 
from engaging in the Palestine issue until 1936, was forced by the agitated concern of especially the 
new effendiyya to do so. The Wafdist ministry of Al-Naḥḥās (and later also the ministry of Muḥammad 
Maḥmūd: 1938-1939) found itself drawn into both public and private efforts in support of the 
Palestinian Arabs.47 Egypt played a central role in the collaborative Arab efforts concerning the Palestine 
question. 
When after World War II the Jewish State named ‘Israel’ was proclaimed on May 14, 1948 by David Ben-
Gurion in agreement with the United Nations General Assembly, the League of Arab States opposed this 
and large pro-Palestine demonstrations in Egypt followed whereby Jewish and European institutions 
were attacked. A few hours after the creation of the state Israel, the armies of Egypt and those of Jordan, 
Iraq, Syria and Lebanon crossed the borders of Palestine. Both sides sustained many losses, but one can 
say that the Arabs dramatically lost the war.48 These events contributed to the disillusionment and 
political instability of the time.  
Egyptian Jews 
In the interbellum, Jews49 occupied a secure and respected place in Egyptian society: no restrictions 
were imposed on their religious, cultural, social, economic or political life, Zionism included. In the 
Egyptian economy, Jews were considered to be highly influential.50 Especially under the rule of king 
Fu’ād I (his son Farūq I was more Germany-inclined, as noted above), the Jews of Egypt were an 
accepted and protected part of public life. Matthias Küntzel explains that Jews were members of 
parliament, were employed at the royal palace and occupied important positions in the economic and 
political spheres.51   
The Egyptian Muslim majority viewed the Jews as just one of several non-Muslim minorities, ‘and not 
the most important or potentially threatening one.’52 They were, according to Krämer, consequently 
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50 Ibid. 
51 Küntzel, 16. 
52 Krämer, 223. There were the Copts who were by far the most important non-Muslim minority, and the Greeks 
who rivalled the Jews in numbers, economic power, social prestige and cultural influence. Also the Syrians and 
the Armenians, though fewer in number, played an important part (ibid.). 
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included by the Muslim majority in one group, amongst whom were not only the Greek, (Christian) 
Syrian and Armenian people, but also the British, the French and the Belgians living in Egypt.53  
Especially the Egyptian Jewish middle and upper classes adopted the European culture and education, 
languages and first names, and gradually integrated into the cosmopolitan subculture. Gudrun Krämer 
notes that on the economic level, these classes were closely linked to, and identified with the economic 
system established and upheld by the colonial power. Politically, the Jewish elite stressed its loyalty to 
the Egyptian nation and the king, but barely participated in the national struggle:54 ‘The dynamism and 
westernization of the Jewish middle and upper classes, which proved so useful in the economic sphere, 
maneuvered them into a marginal, and ultimately precarious position within Egyptian society at large.’55 
Yet Krämer notes that there is no indication of any hostility towards Jews in the years between World 
War I and the outbreak of the Arab revolt in Palestine in 1936.56 Matthias Küntzel adds that the Zionist 
movement in the first third of the twentieth century was likewise accepted impartially as up until that 
point there was a lack of emotion regarding the Palestine issue.57  
In the second half of the thirties, relations between the Muslim majority and the local Jewish minority 
deteriorated, although this didn’t lead to open persecution or mass migration. Due to the socio-
economic difficulties and the change in outlook towards Islam and pan-Arabism described above, public 
life was increasingly defined on Arab and Islamic lines. Foreign presence wasn’t much appreciated: the 
large majority of Greeks, Italians, Belgians, French and British left Egypt, especially after 1936. Jews had 
more strikes against them than others who stayed.58 The Jews were increasingly regarded as the enemy 
by committed Muslim nationalists.59 Krämer concludes: ‘In sum, a Jewish question as it emerged in 
nineteenth-century Europe did not exist in twentieth-century Egypt. Jews were not discriminated 
against because of their religion or race, but for political reasons (it. AJ). While it was possible to mobilize 
                                                             
53 Krämer, 223, 224. 
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56 Idem, 224. Krämer does suggest that religious sentiments against Jews at the time may have been latently 
present, because in later years these sentiments could be easily activated. Still, she holds that the negative 
references in Islamic Holy Scriptures, denouncing Jews as enemies of the Prophet and Islam, remained irrelevant 
in Egypt until the late 1930s. From then on, they began to be cited in the context of the Palestine conflict. And 
even from the late thirties onwards, religious arguments against Jews were restricted to opposition groups in the 
nationalist and Islamic camps (idem, 225, 226). I will elaborate on this issue in chapter 3.  
57 Küntzel, 16.  
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existence to be challenged. The conflict with Israel on the contrary did have religious symbolism: for one, the 
fight for Jerusalem, for it was a central Muslim symbol. Secondly, Jewish presence in the House of Islam (Dār al-
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(idem, 99, 100). 
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religious (Islamic) resentment against them (…), religious resentment was secondary and only came to 
bear under specific political and economic circumstances [i.e. the Palestine conflict].’60  
Egypt’s second Revolution 
The Second World War had ended, and the Jewish State had been declared. Great Britain still had rights 
in Egypt according to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. In 1950, the Wafd won the general election and Al-
Naḥḥās again formed a government. He couldn’t reach an agreement with Great Britain, so in 1951 he 
abrogated the Treaty of 1936, which was subsequently followed by large anti-British demonstrations 
and guerrilla warfare against the British presence in the Canal Zone. Al-Naḥḥās was dismissed, and four 
Prime Ministers succeeded him in the next six months. This continued instability, caused by the growing 
Egyptian resentment of the continued British control over Egypt and the political power struggles that 
resulted from this, led to the second Revolution in 1952.  
Radical measures were wished for. A military coup was executed by the movement of the Free Officers, 
led by Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣīr – better known for an English speaking audience as ‘Gamal Abdel Nasser’ – 
on July 23, 1952. The preparations for this coup took place in close coordination with the Muslim 
Brothers, who had been legalized in 1951. King Farūq I was forced to abdicate, in favour of his son Fu’ād 
II.61 
This, the end of Egypt’s monarchy caused by the second Revolution of 1952 led by Gamal Nasser, is the 
end of the period of time relevant to this study. Of course, Egypt’s history didn’t stop here. An 
agreement was signed in February 1953: a transitional period of self-government for the Sudan would 
be established, and the Sudan would be granted full independence in January 1956. The Egyptian 
Republic was declared on June 18, 1953. Prolonged negotiations led to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement 
signed in 1954, in which it was stated that British troops were to evacuate gradually from the Canal 
Zone. General Muḥammad Naguib was the first president of the Republic, but was forced to resign in 
1954 by Nasser, who became president, and who was ‘the real architect of the 1952 movement’. After 
an attempt was made to assassinate Nasser by a Muslim Brother, the Brotherhood was again banned. 
A number of members was executed, and hundreds of Brothers were imprisoned – a move that 
triggered a generation of Muslim Brothers to draw even more radical conclusions about the future of 
Egypt.  
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Nasser declared full independence of Egypt from Britain on June 18, 1956. He nationalized the Suez 
Canal on July 26, 1956, which prompted the Suez Crisis. Three years after the 1967 Six Day War (which 
Israel victoriously won from Egypt), Nasser died and was succeeded by Anwar Sādāt.62  
 
1.2 Egypt and Nazism: two stories to be told  
Whereas I have already elaborated shortly on the influence of Nazi Germany on Egypt during the 
monarchy in the first section of this chapter, in this final section I will go further into this topic, as it will 
shed some light on the way the nationalists of interest – Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and Sayyid Quṭb – dealt with 
Nazism as discussed in the following two chapters. 
When reading about the role of Nazi Germany in Egypt and on the response of the Egyptian people to 
Nazism in particular – the topic that is the focus of this thesis – one point is striking: that there are two 
stories prevalent among scholars. The title of the first story could well be: ‘A pro-Axis Egypt!’ The second 
story: ‘A pr o-Axis Egypt?’ Note the difference in punctuation marks. The main question is whether the 
majority of Egyptians welcomed and rejoiced in the Nazi ideology (as some historians claim), or rejected 
Nazism point blank (as others argue). Both stories will be discussed in this section.  
The traditional narrative: a pro-Axis Egypt! 
Robert St. John in his book The Boss. The story of Gamal Abdel Nasser, published more than fifty years 
ago in 1960, is an advocate of the traditional narrative. The pro-German position is understood as part 
of a larger narrative: the revolutionary story of Nasser, aided by his Free Officers, initiating the second 
Revolution in Egypt and becoming president in the fifties. The pro-Axis narrative can be discerned in the 
decades leading up to the Revolution: the thirties and forties are described as the source of 
revolutionary motivation, and are only considered in this light. These were the times Nasser and his 
associates were allegedly inspired by the totalitarian regimes of Italy and Germany. Mussolini and Hitler 
were admired and they were the inspiration to carry out a revolution in Egypt: to achieve a prosperous 
economy, to create a vast military power, and to win international prestige. Military officers like Nasser 
set up underground organizations to prepare the ground for the Axis’ conquest of Egypt and to eliminate 
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the British occupation.63 Especially the ‘February 4th Incident’ was used by them to launch an anti-British, 
pro-Nazi revolution.64 St. John’s conclusion: Egypt had betrayed the Allies.65 
Not only Nasser and his Free Officers were enthusiastic about the Nazis, according to St. John. Their 
actions were based on the ‘fact’ that there existed a general sympathy among the Egyptian public for 
Nazism. Egypt’s youth in particular was influenced by Italian fascism and German Nazism. We can read 
how on the streets of Cairo ‘Rommel! Rommel! Rommel!’ was shouted by the crowds.66 St. John writes: 
‘The pro-Axis sympathies of most Egyptians at this time were not based alone on the conviction that the 
Germans and Italians were going to win the war. Nor alone on the Arab proverb: “He who is the enemy 
of my enemy is my friend.” The ideology of the two totalitarian powers was ready-made for a country 
like Egypt. (…) There was something in it for every Egyptian (it. AJ). Military men such as young Lieutenant 
Nasser were impressed by the might of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe, by the military genius that 
had so quickly brought about the fall of Warsaw, Copenhagen, Oslo, Brussels, Paris, Athens and 
Belgrade.’67 
That this traditional pro-Axis storyline isn’t a view held only by older historians, is shown by the earlier 
mentioned study of Matthias Küntzel Jihad and Jew-Hatred. Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11, 
written in 2007. Whilst this book offers a lot of interesting information, the traditional narrative of ‘a 
pro-Axis Egypt!’ is the story told by Küntzel. He gives his readers a narrative in which Jew-hating Egyptian 
Muslims are the main characters. Muslims who rejected the Nazi views on Jews are, despite a few 
exceptions, absent.  
Küntzel writes: ‘Throughout the Arab world, National Socialism often met with sympathy and not 
infrequently with enthusiasm (it. AJ). This affinity was not only based on the conviction they were fighting 
the same enemies – Britain and France. In addition, the German idea of the people (Volk) defined by 
language, culture and blood rather than borders and political sovereignty, was far closer to the Islamic 
notion of the umma than to the British or French concept of citizenship. For in the Arab as well as 
German tradition, communities, not individuals, are the basic element.’68 The Arab response to the 
upcoming Nazis went hand in hand with hostilities that are described by Küntzel, who attributes a large 
role to the Jew-hating Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Amīn al-Ḥusaynī.   
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Noteworthy is that Küntzel proposes that the opposition towards Israel is what binds the Arabs from 
1948 onwards. He writes: ‘It is remarkable that since then the cohesion of the Arab world has been 
defined not by religion or a particular relationship to Britain or the USA, but by opposition to Zionism or 
more precisely Israel. Hatred of the Jews has become the most important shared bond.’69 Can this, then, 
be added to the supra-Egyptian ideas described by Gershoni and Jankowski, that came up in the Egyptian 
thirties? Aside from a shared history, language and religion, that define and bind the Arab nation 
together, a shared enemy can now be added to (the top of) the list. 
In conclusion, there are four arguments that the pro-Axis-narratives have in common, many of which 
can be detected in St. John’s and Küntzel’s views as well: (1) ‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend’: the 
Egyptians sought for an ally against British occupation and Rommel was an ideal candidate. The entire 
Egyptian community supported his campaign. (2) The fascist and Nazi ideologies and practices are in 
tune with ‘the Egyptian Muslim mentality’. (3) The ‘liberal experiment’ (to establish liberal-democratic 
institutions) of the twenties had failed in the thirties. Fascism and Nazism offered a form of government 
that was far more suitable to the political culture than liberalism. (4) ‘The betrayal of the intellectuals’: 
Egypt’s leading intellectuals undergo a ‘crisis of orientation’, and start writing about Islam and the early 
Islamic society, fostering fundamentalist orientations and venerating fascism and Nazism.70 
The counternarrative: a pro-Axis Egypt? 
The second storyline, titled a pro-Axis Egypt?, questions the abovementioned traditional storyline.  
Gershoni in Beyond Anti-Semitism: Egyptian Responses to German Nazism and Italian Fascism in the 
1930s is one of the scholars who informs us of this counternarrative.71 First, he explains how the 
traditional narrative (called ‘the conventional and hegemonic master-narrative’72) came into being.  
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The Revolution’s leaders wished to present themselves as the anti-colonial power and therefore 
invented and spread a self-narrative during the fifties, ‘which anchored their origins in the second World 
War, and described it in light of the anti-colonial struggle that would take place the following decade.’73 
The anti-British experience of the fifties was projected on to the early forties, which was ‘clearly a 
revolutionary retrospective reading of the 1920s and 1930s’ and an exaggeration of pro-Nazi 
tendencies, although there were marginal pro-Nazi expressions in the political and cultural peripheries 
of Egyptian society.74 This story was then taken over by historians, both Egyptian and Western: most 
historians who describe Nasser’s Revolution of 1952 (St. John included) argued that the Revolution had 
its roots in the Second World War. Egypt’s so called betrayal of the Allies is placed at the centre of this 
narrative.75 
The counternarrative in short, argues that there was more resistance towards Nazism during the thirties 
and forties than jubilation. Gershoni clams that an overwhelming majority of the Egyptian voices (‘in 
political, intellectual, professional and educated circles, but in the urban middle classes and literate 
popular culture as well’) rejected fascism and Nazism: ‘as an ideology, as a practice, and as an enemy of 
the enemy [i.e. the British].’76 He tells this counternarrative by reviewing and nullifying the four pro-Axis 
arguments mentioned above: 
(1) Concerning the theory that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’: Gershoni has done research on 
‘the Egyptian public’s attitude’ in the thirties, and by this he means the ‘entire cultural field of public 
opinion that can be reconstructed from scores of newspapers, hundreds of books, works of art and radio 
broadcasts.’77 From all this, it becomes clear that the response to Nazism was expressed through three 
types of representation: the Nazis were seen as imperialists, as extreme totalitarianists, and as racists. 
Gershoni writes: ‘As far back as the early 1930s, the Egyptians themselves refuted the paradigmatic 
claim that Egyptian sympathy for fascism and Nazism was based on hostility towards their British 
occupiers and on the concept of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”.’ For: fascists were considered an 
arch-imperialist phenomenon78, and Egypt’s intellectuals preferred even the British and French 
imperialism to that of Italy and Germany. An alliance with the ‘enemy of the enemy’ represented a 
danger, ‘more demonic and imperialistic than the enemy himself.’79 
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(2) Gershoni in this article doesn’t refute explicitly the argument that the totalitarian Nazi ideology 
matches the ‘Muslim mentality’. However, as his whole article shows, there was no match between 
totalitarianism and ‘the Muslims’, since the majority was opposed to fascism and Nazism (despite a few 
exceptions in the periphery).80 This nullifies the traditional argument.   
(3) As for the failure of the ‘liberal experiment’ and the alternative Nazism offers: there is inconclusive 
evidence for the failure of the Egyptian system of parliamentary democracy, according to Gershoni. The 
democracy was not in a crisis or decline: the Wafd party made sure of this. This party was the dominant 
force in Egyptian politics, and the central democratic power. When general elections were held, the 
Wafd won them by a large majority. Attempts of conservative authoritarian forces to take over the 
government, society and culture, were halted by the Wafd. Mainstream intellectuals who were opposed 
to Nazism, and who supported democracy and freedom of expression were backed by this party, both 
politically and morally.81  
(4) Finally, the ‘betrayal of the intellectuals’ is discussed. The intellectuals are said to have come to the 
conclusion that parliamentary constitutional government was incompatible with Islamic society. 
Gershoni argues that this conclusion is based on the Islamiyyāt genre alone (i.e. the literature that was 
written on the Prophet, the first Caliphs and other classical Islamic heroes). When taking into account 
other textual corpora produced by these intellectuals in the thirties, it becomes clear that they were 
not ‘enmeshed in a “crisis of orientation”, but continued to advocate an Enlightenment’s 
Weltanschauung, reason, progress, science, liberty, civil rights, democracy and alongside these, 
constitutional parliamentary government.’82 Furthermore, the intellectuals were aware of what was 
taking place in the Nazi and fascist regimes of Germany and Italy as they anxiously followed the 
developments. Already in the middle of the twenties, after Mussolini had consolidated his power in Italy, 
the intellectuals had begun criticising fascist totalitarianism and dictatorship. After 1933, the major 
critique was directed against Nazi Germany.83 Both ideologies were rejected as oppressive machines of 
power that attempted to obliterate any individual expression, annihilate society and undermine 
parliament and constitutional government. Fascism and Nazism were considered to be extreme 
imperialistic regimes, which also spread racist ideas that needed to be completely rejected.84 Nazism 
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had to be fought by all means, which led to the conviction that Egypt should support the Allies: ‘morally, 
ideologically and politically.’85 
In the next two chapters, two influential nationalists will be discussed: Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and Sayyid Quṭb. 
From their narrative constructions, we will discover who they were and to which kind of nationalism 
they belonged. Furthermore, their response to Nazism will become apparent: were they characters in 
the ‘Pro-Axis!’ or ‘Pro-Axis?’ account? And what role did they play: supporting role or heroic main 
character? In what follows I will delve into their autobiographies in search of answers to these questions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Ṭāhā Ḥusayn – a visionary 
2.1 Introduction 
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, the research question of this thesis is: ‘What position on 
Nazism did Egyptian nationalist intellectuals Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and Sayyid Quṭb occupy?’ To answer this 
question, it was necessary to explore the political and social history of the Egyptian monarchy as well as 
the Egyptian majority’s response to Nazism, in order to contextualize the thoughts and works of these 
two intellectuals. The focus of the present and following chapters are Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and Sayyid Quṭb 
respectively. How did these nationalists in particular ‘redefine the Egyptian nation’, and respond to the 
Nazi influences of their days?  
We will commence in 2.2 by making acquaintance with Ṭāhā Ḥusayn: who was this famous intellectual? 
How did he live his life? What did he find important? Next, in 2.3 we will discover both his answer to the 
question: ‘What should Egypt do with her independence?’ and his redefinition of the Egyptian nation. 
Then, in 2.4, his ideas on Nazism will become manifest.  
 
2.2 Biography: crossing the canal 
Nadaf Safran, in his book Egypt in Search of Political Community. An Analysis of the Intellectual and 
Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952, summarizes Ṭāhā Ḥusayn’s life as follows:  
Born in a small village in upper Egypt and the seventh child of a minor employee in a sugar plantation, 
blind since the age of three, Ṭāha lived to become the undisputed dean of modern Egyptian and Arabic 
literature, to reach the positions of head of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Cairo, founder of 
the University of Alexandria, Minister of Education, and to be honoured by Oxford and the Universities 
of Lyons, Rome, Madrid, and Athens.86 
While of course much more can and will be said about the person and life of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Safran, in 
this one sentence tells us a lot about this Egyptian intellectual. He introduces us to the unexpected, 
impressive road the blind village boy has travelled – starting in 1889 in the village ‘Izbat al-Kīlū and 
ending up in Egypt’s capital and seat of Parliament: Cairo. A route of many twists and turns lies in 
between, much of which Ḥusayn himself has documented in his famous three part autobiography called 
The Days (Al-Ayyām), published between 1926 and 1967. The first volume of this autobiography deals 
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with his upbringing in the village, the second with his experiences at the Azhar, and the third with his 
studies at the Cairo University and abroad.87 As I want Ḥusayn to speak for himself about his own life, in 
his own words, I will use many quotations from these works.88 In addition I will give the floor to many 
secondary studies written by experts on Ṭāhā Ḥusayn.  
Ḥusayn (1898-1973), in the first part of his autobiography titled An Egyptian Childhood, describes his 
youth in ‘Izbat al-Kīlū as the seventh child out of a family of fifteen children.89 This small village is one 
kilometre away from the city of Maghāgha, and a good 250 kilometres south of Cairo. We can read how 
the blind Ḥusayn explains that only a small section of this already small village was the only world he 
knew of:  
He [Ṭāhā Ḥusayn90] was convinced that the world ended to the right of him with the canal, which was 
only a few paces away from where he stood… and why not? For he could not appreciate the width of this 
canal, nor could he reckon that this expanse was so narrow that any active youth could jump from one 
bank to the other. Nor could he imagine that there was human, animal and vegetable life on the other 
side of the canal just as much as there was on his side.91 
Furthermore, in An Egyptian Childhood Ḥusayn describes how he was brought up in a traditional, mostly 
Sufi environment, characterized by him as ‘simple, mystical and ignorant.’92 Many Sufi books were read 
to him, and Ḥusayn was destined to be a sheikh, just like his father. He therefore went to the village 
kuttāb (a traditional, Qur’ānic school) and was, as many other boys from the village, drilled by various 
local religious teachers to learn the Qur’ān by heart – the main objective of his education. Ḥusayn 
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succeeded and therefore became a sheikh when he was only nine years old.93 However, the education 
by many experts of religion caused Ḥusayn much confusion in his mind at a young age. He writes: 
Our lad used to mix freely with all these ulema and took something from them all, so that he gathered 
together a vast amount of assorted knowledge which was confused and contradictory. I can only reckon 
that it made no small contribution to the formation of his mind, which was not free from confusion, 
conflicting opinions ad contradictions.94 
During his Egyptian childhood, Ḥusayn lost both a little sister and an older brother – two very painful 
events that completely changed his outlook on life.95 One way in which the young Ḥusayn coped with 
these losses, was by becoming very religious (extra fasting, praying, alms-giving and reciting the 
Quran).96 Through living this life style Ḥusayn thought he could take away some of the ‘sins’ of his 
brother. 
In An Egyptian Childhood the readers learn that Ḥusayn turned blind at the age of three. As a young 
child, Ḥusayn contracted opthalmia. Medical attention of the modern type was virtually non-existent: 
because of his condition, the village barber was finally called in to help. His ‘treatment’ caused not 
healing, but blindness.97 On several occasions in all of the three parts of The Days, Ḥusayn writes about 
his solitude, summed up well by Malti-Douglas: ‘lack of mobility and social isolation go together, and 
both are tied to blindness.’98 
Although his blindness made Ḥusayn feel helpless and anxious both as a boy and an adolescent, later 
on, after a ‘process of rebirth’,99 Ḥusayn found his voice, and became more of a confident man. He 
entered into theological debates with whomever was willing to debate with him. Ḥusayn creates a 
picture of his increasing ability to come to terms with his blindness and creating a social role for himself: 
he insists on behaving as a sighted person with the help of persons who become his eyes. He wants to 
break through barriers that used to confine the blind.100 We can also read how Ḥusayn’s loss of eyesight 
and his wish to be in the background caused Ḥusayn to indulge in what he calls ‘the art of listening’: 
Now this abstention of his from play [for he didn’t want to be ridiculed101] led him to become fond of one 
kind of diversion, and that was listening to stories and legends. His great delight was to listen to the songs 
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of the bard or the conversation of his father with other men or of his mother with other women, and so 
he acquired the art of listening.102 
Ḥusayn in his autobiography describes how in his days there were only two options for blind people 
‘who want to live a tolerable life’:103 functioning as a reader of the Qur’ān at funerals and in private 
houses, or studying at the Azhar, winning a degree and being assured of a livelihood from the daily 
allowance. Ḥusayn writes that he had no choice ‘but to pursue his course of life at the Azhar.’104 Thus in 
1902, at the age of thirteen, Ḥusayn left his village to go to the ‘bastion of [Sunni] traditionalism’,105 the 
‘venerable college of al-Azhar in Cairo’,106 where he spent the next six years of his life studying religion 
and Arabic literature.  
This part of his life is described in detail in the second part of his autobiography, The Stream of Days. A 
Student at the Azhar. What Ḥusayn strived for, was collecting more and more knowledge. It would 
become his life work: 
His father and the learned friends who came to visit him had spoken of knowledge as a boundless ocean, 
and the child had never taken this expression for a figure of speech or a metaphor, but as the simple 
truth. He had come to Cairo and to the Azhar with the intention of throwing himself into this ocean and 
drinking what he could of it, until the day he drowned. What finer end could there be for a man of spirit 
than to drown himself in knowledge? What a splendid plunge into the beyond!107 
It becomes clear in this second volume that Ḥusayn finds it hard to study at the Azhar. Especially the 
endless repetition of tradition by the sheikhs and therefore the lack of creativity bother him. 
Furthermore, Ḥusayn ask many questions at the Azhar: too many in the opinion of the shaykhs. On 
different occasions he is sent away from class, and even from the school.108 In 1908 Ḥusayn, fed up by 
the educational system at the Azhar and more and more attracted to secularism, became one of the 
first students at the newly founded and worldly oriented Cairo University as well, where European 
orientalists gave lectures that changed his perspective on his own inherited Egyptian culture.109 Ḥusayn 
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writes that these teachers enabled him to cling to a strong element of authentic Eastern culture, and to 
hold together in a balanced harmony the learning of both East and West.110 About the limitless learning 
possibilities in the University, he says: 
Life in the University (…) emancipated me from the confined, confused atmosphere of the Azhar (…) into 
an ample, uninhibited milieu which allowed me to fill my lungs with fresh air on my way to and fro and 
likewise to fill my mind with open knowledge which did not bind me like the narrow structures of the 
Azhar professors in their lecturing, nor ruin my intelligence with qanqalahs (citations), and arguments 
about this and that, and endless equivocation.111 
Six years later, Ḥusayn received the University’s first doctorate on the blind Arabic poet and writer Abū 
al-‘Alā’ al-Ma‘arrī. 
While studying at the Cairo University, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn wanted to enjoy Western, French, education as 
well. His departure to France was postponed because of the outbreak of World War I.112 When the 
Germans were driven back from Paris, Ḥusayn received permission to depart.113 Together with a 
brother, he continued his studies overseas. We can read about this in the third part of his 
autobiography: A Passage to France, which was published only six months before his death. One can 
state therefore that the volume it is the work of long retrospect.114 In it we find a narrative that 
‘constitutes a personal saga of tenacity and perseverance in the face of daunting odds – blindness, the 
demands of French academic disciplines, the acquisition of new languages, the vicissitudes of the First 
World War and the jostling hopes and fears of a strenuous and sensitive ambition.’115 His stay in France 
‘would cement his cultural ideas and the appeal that the West had always had for him.’116  
In 1915, at the University of Montpellier Ḥusayn learnt Greek and Latin and he immersed himself in 
classical culture, in which he obtained his master’s degree. Next, from 1915 till 1919, he took courses 
at the University of Paris (the Sorbonne) in history, philosophy and sociology. Also he continued to study 
the works of orientalists as he had done in Egypt. He earned a second doctorate for his thesis on the 
social philosophy of Tunisian historian Ibn-Khaldūn.  
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In France, Ḥusayn also met his future wife Suzanne Bresseau.117 The effects of the war were noticeable 
for the couple. Ḥusayn speaks of the bombs that had fallen in the quarter they lived in, and buildings 
being destroyed close to their abode.118 Suzanne and Ṭāhā survived the war however and studies were 
resumed.  
When the news came that Egypt was seeking independence from the British occupiers (i.e. the First 
Revolution), Ḥusayn writes that ‘it set my heart aglow with gladness’. Also, when the Egyptians revolted 
against Zaghlūl’s expulsion to Malta, for Ḥusayn this felt like ‘water to a burning thirst.’119 When Zaghlūl 
and his delegation came to the peace conference in Paris, Ḥusayn and Zaghlūl talked about the 
independence. Zaghlūl is quoted as saying: ‘Here we are, we’ve come to Paris, and are denied access to 
the Peace Conference and excluded from all contact with the representatives of the Powers taking part 
in it.’ Ḥusayn replied: ‘Nevertheless, these efforts will awaken the people and alert them to their rights 
and thus inspire them to demand those rights and pursue them vigorously.’120 
After his studies were finished, Ḥusayn and his wife rushed back to Egypt together with their firstborn. 
He was content with Egypt’s independence (for the country was allowed to now manage her own 
affairs121), but not so much with the ‘superficial aspects of the negotiations’, with the result that 
independence itself ‘was almost forgotten and abandoned in internal strife.’122 For this reason, Ḥusayn 
wasn’t a big fan of Sa’d Zaghlūl.123  
Here, after the declaration of independence in 1922, The Days comes to an end. What happened next? 
First of all, it has to be noted that Ḥusayn and his wife spent much of their time living outside Egypt. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that Ḥusayn thus lived across two civilizations (the French and the 
Egyptian), both in his personal as in his intellectual life. For around thirty years after their return to 
Egypt, Ḥusayn was ‘at the very centre of literary and academic life in Egypt.’124 In 1919, he was appointed 
professor of classical literature in the Cairo University. Next, he was transferred to the faculty of Arabic 
letters,125 and later founded the University of Alexandria, where he was rector. Furthermore, he served 
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as a writer and literary editor for several magazines and newspapers.126 Nadaf Safran writes strikingly: 
‘This combination of teaching, journalism, translating, and writing scholarly and popular works on Arabic 
and French cultures, in addition to the novels he began later – all of it done in a didactic spirit – 
constituted the normal pattern of his activity (…).127 
To share some more insight in the person of Ḥusayn, it will be interesting to highlight one important – 
provocative – work of his hand:  On Pre-Islamic Poetry (Fī al-Shi‘r al-Jāhilī), published in 1926. This book 
caused quite a stir in the Arabic world, and it would eventually lead to his dismissal from the 
University,128 for Ḥusayn, using the methods of modern critical scholarship,129 attacks certain basic 
Islamic dogmas in this study.130 He openly questions the authenticity of pre-Islamic poetry that had been 
used for many generations ‘as a linguistic reference source for interpreting the terms of the Qur’ān and 
the Tradition, and as a historical source in his own right.’131 In On Pre-Islamic Poetry the ground under 
many thus far unquestioned interpretations of holy Islamic scripture, on which many laws and doctrines 
had been based, was cut by Ḥusayn. He writes:  
This poetry proves nothing and tells nothing and should not be used, as it has been, as an instrument in 
the science of the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth. For, undoubtedly it was tailored and invented all of a piece so 
that the ‘ulamā’ might prove by it what they had set out to prove.132  
Ḥusayn even hinted in his book that the Qur’ān should not be seen as an objective history book. For 
example, he ridiculed the traditionally accepted dogma that jinns exist, and that they were able to 
compose poetry. Similarly he doubted the historicity of the story of Ibrāhīm and Ismā‘īl.133  
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The years following his dismissal from the Cairo University, Ḥusayn spent much time fighting against 
Prime Minister Ismā’īl Ṣidqī who was the cause of his dismissal. He aligned himself actively with Ṣidqī’s 
chief opponent: the Wafd party.134 As a reward he was granted the position of Secretary-General in the 
Ministry of Education of the Naḥḥās government (1941-1945), and of Minister of Education in the last 
Wafd government (1950-1952) before the overthrow of monarchy. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn also became chairman 
of the cultural committee of the League of Arab States.135 
In his famous work The Future of Culture in Egypt (Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa fī Miṣr), published in 1938, 
Ḥusayn wrote extensively about the importance of education (and he made clear: not the religious 
education system). He published this book two years after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed in 1936. 
In The Future of Culture in Egypt Ḥusayn wrote a ‘redefinition of the Egyptian nation’, to be discussed 
extensively in the next section. As Minister of Education, Ḥusayn could partially realize his dream about 
education, which is elaborately described in the book: he was able to promote and realise free education 
for everyone, either rich or poor.136  
Furthermore, Ḥusayn wrote frequently about the deep cultural and spiritual significance of Islam, above 
characterized as Islamiyyāt. He wrote, for example, the three volume book In the Margin of the 
Prophet’s Tradition (‘Alā Hāmish al-Sīrah), the first volume being published in 1933.137  
When Gamal Nasser came to power after the second Revolution in 1952, Ḥusayn lost his position in 
government, as did other Wafdist officials. However, he welcomed the downfall of the corrupt 
monarchy and supported Nasser’s newfound nationalism.138 In his later years, Ḥusayn served as 
president of the Arab language academy in Cairo.  
Until his death in 1973 at the age of 83, Ḥusayn continued to write many novels, short stories, political 
articles, extended historical and critical studies and translations of Western classics. Albert Hourani 
writes in Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. 1798-1939 that the majority and best of his works were 
written in the years between the First and Second World War: ‘although since then, he has written much 
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and has become the elder statesman of Egyptian letters, he has received honorary doctorates and 
attended international seminars.’139  
We can conclude: Ḥusayn travelled a long road, both personally and academically. He started from a 
very humble and traditional background (being a blind, relatively poor village boy, destined to be a 
shaykh, and later on a student at the Azhar), and ended up in the highest ranks of Parliament where he 
prevented the illiteracy of many Egyptians. Many twists and turns lie in between: many novels, essays 
and studies that shook op the traditional way of looking at things. We can now fully understand the 
quote of Safran at the beginning of this section. Stated slightly differently in Blindness and 
Autobiography. Al-Ayyām of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Malti-Douglas writes strikingly: ‘From a modest rural 
background, the young man grew up to conquer the West educationally, then returned to his homeland 
and reshaped its intellectual and cultural future.’140   
 
2.3 Ḥusayn’s view of the Egyptian nation 
In order to understand Ṭāhā Ḥusayn’s concept of nationalism we need to engage with his vision of ‘the 
East’ and ‘the West’. This – the conflict between the traditional and the modern, and between the East 
and the West – is one of the themes we can detect in The Days.141 The life of Ḥusayn can be seen as a 
constant fight with his traditional background – pulling away from the village, from al-Azhar, and even 
from Egypt – and an ever-stronger attraction to the West – to the city, to the Cairo University and to 
France. ‘The traditional’ in The Days is often depicted as negative, and on many occasions we can read 
how Ṭāhā Ḥusayn breaks with tradition.142 Throughout his autobiography we find this process of 
separation: ‘going from village to city, from East to West, meant crossing boundaries and transcending 
limits.’143 
Ḥusayn falls in love with the West. Not only did he marry a French woman: before this event we can 
read how he felt drawn to the modern ‘tarbush wearers’ he came across in Cairo, to the Orientalist 
teachers and other seculars at the University, and later to the Europeans in France.144 ‘The West’ in The 
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Days is held up as a positive role model:145 it is associated with culture and education, and with the 
freedom Ḥusayn finds after breaking out of his traditional social role.146  
However, the West isn’t always positively portrayed. For Malti-Douglas writes: ‘The traditional is 
normally identified with the East, but the modern, though often synonymous with the West, need not 
always be so (it. AJ).’147 Although Malti-Douglas doesn’t give any examples of this last remark, there are 
instances I can think of. One of de discrepancies between the modern and the West, is the role the First 
World War plays in A Passage to France. Ḥusayn writes:  
All the years of the First World War I had spent in France and I had not lived through them in blissful 
ignorance of what was going on around me or oblivious of the implications of those evens. I do not 
remember a day passing in which I was not preoccupied with the course of the War and its reverberations 
in France and within the other belligerents. I read the French newspapers avidly, thinking long and hard 
about all that I read.148 
It becomes clear in The Days that Ḥusayn finds the war in the West far from being modern, and standing 
in sharp contrast to modern scholarly freedom. The discrepancy between the traditional and the East 
can be found as well, for example when Egypt gained (more) independence in 1922: for Ḥusayn, this is 
a sign that Egypt can indeed be modern as the West.149 
From The Days – which stops describing his life right after Egypt’s independence of 1922 – we may well 
conclude that Ṭāhā Ḥusayn’s nationalism has a territorialist inclination. This is in line with the ‘territorial 
nationalist’ framework of most intellectuals in the twenties, for in The Days the two-sided process is 
noticeable of Ḥusayn on the one hand wanting to eliminate European domination and striving for 
Egyptian independence and on the other, admiring the West, ‘recognizing’ European supremacy and 
drawing from it in the process of nation-building. Ḥusayn sees the West generally as the only model to 
lead Egypt forward.150  
How did Ḥusayn’s nationalism develop in the two following decades? In order to answer this question, 
we will explore his abovementioned book The Future of Culture in Egypt, published in 1938, two years 
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after the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. This book forms Ḥusayn’s redefinition of the Egyptian 
nation, and answers the question of the time: ‘What to do with Egypt’s independence?’ 
Ḥusayn explains his motivation for writing this book in its introduction. He mentions that the signing of 
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in London, ‘restored to Egypt a large measure of both her internal and 
external independence.’ Secondly, Ḥusayn describes the experience he had in Paris during several 
conferences which he attended both as a representative of the Ministry of Education and the Egyptian 
University, and as an observer (his ‘art of listening’ comes to mind). Ḥusayn explains that during these 
conferences what he ‘saw and heard stimulated a flow of ideas, feelings and hopes that simply had to 
be recorded’151 for the youth of Egypt who deserve a better future than the previous (i.e. his own) 
generation. Ḥusayn writes in his introduction how the elder generation is anxious for the younger 
generation to ‘win for their country the glory and honour as well as the comfort and ease that their 
elders could not achieve.’152  
Ḥusayn observes the situation of Egypt – the independence due to the 1936 Treaty and therefore ‘the 
revival of her honour’,153 and, inspired by European ideas, he writes a book on the future of Egypt. 
Already in the first lines of the book, Ḥusayn portrays the West as the model for Egypt. Even more so, 
not following this model in the past, according to Ḥusayn, was the reason for Egypt to have lost her 
independence. He notes: ‘Had not Egypt neglected culture and science, willingly or unwillingly, she 
would not have lost her freedom and independence and would have been spared the struggle to regain 
them.’154  
It is undeniable that Ḥusayn with this introduction continues his territorial nationalism of the twenties. 
And this line of the West being the role model for Egypt is elaborated upon in the rest of the book. What 
to do with Egypt’s independence? Ḥusayn writes: ‘We must not stand before freedom and 
independence in contented admiration. Like all advanced nations, Egypt must regard them as a means 
of attaining perfection.’155 Only admiring the independence will get Egypt nowhere, and will be seen as 
a failure by the Europeans, who will ‘magnify every shortcoming, however trivial, and say: they 
demanded their independence and struggled for it, but when they finally obtained it, they did not taste 
or enjoy it – they did not know how to use it!’156 Ḥusayn thus wants the Egyptians not to feel inferior to 
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the Europeans, but wants them to ‘take hold of our affairs with determination and vigour from today 
on.’157 Again, in this quote it is clear that Ḥusayn highlights both sides of nationalism: he admires the 
West, but Egypt shouldn’t remain stuck in this admiration, but should take action and get to work with 
her newly gained independence. 
How to do this, ‘vigorously taking hold of the Egyptian affairs of independence’? First of all, according 
to Ḥusayn, the fundamental question ‘Is Egypt of the East or of the West?’ needs to be answered. This 
is not a geographical question, but a cultural one: ‘Is the Egyptian mind Eastern or Western in its 
imagination, perception, comprehension, and judgment?’158 Ḥusayn’s answer is clear: Egypt is part of 
the West, for it is easier for an Egyptian mind to understand an Englishman or Frenchman than a Chinese 
or Japanese.159 Ḥusayn explains how Egypt in earliest times had no serious contact with ‘the Far Eastern 
mind’, nor with the Persian, but with the Greek.160 
When Egypt belongs to the West, is it not a problem then that Egypt mostly is a Muslim country that 
speaks Arabic, and the West isn’t? Ḥusayn explains that religious and linguistic unity do not necessarily 
go hand in hand with political unity. The Muslims realized this a long time ago, according to Ḥusayn: 
‘They established their states on the basis of practical interests, abandoning religion, language and race 
as exclusively determining factors.’161 Ḥusayn writes subsequently: The fact that Islam spread over the 
world, and that Egypt made it her religion, didn’t change her mentality. He compares it to the European 
situation: the European mentality didn’t change because of Christianity, which originated in the East 
and then spread over Europe.162 
Ḥusayn even holds that Egypt has always been part of Europe as far as intellectual and cultural life is 
concerned.163 He concludes: ‘Wherever we may search, whatever line of investigation we may pursue, 
we shall not find any evidence to justify the thesis that there is a fundamental difference between the 
European and Egyptian minds.’164 The fact that Egypt is now drawing closer and closer to Europe and is 
becoming an integral part of her, Ḥusayn only sees as a confirmation of his thesis that Egypt is in fact 
European: the process of Egypt taking over more and more from Europe (building railroads, telegraph 
lines, telephones, sitting at the table, eating with knife and fork, wearing European clothes, adopting 
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the European system of government and ‘the European ideal becoming our ideal’, etc.165) ‘would be 
much more difficult than it is if the Egyptian mind were basically different from the European.’166 
In short: what should the Egyptians do with their independence? The answer is simple: she should follow 
the Europeans – ‘We must literally and forthrightly do everything that they do.’167 Concerning 
‘administration, legislation, and education Egypt shouldn’t behave differently’.168 This also meant for 
Ḥusayn that Egyptians have to let go of the idea that there are nations created to rule and to be ruled: 
‘the principle of equality in rights and duties which we want to prevail in Egypt must also govern our 
relations with Europe’, he says.169 A new Egyptian generation should be raised that has no idea of the 
humiliation and shame ‘that was the lot of their fathers: this can be done only by building education on 
a solid foundation.’170 This new generation needs to be brought up with both Western ideas and with a 
love for their own country: Arabic language and literature.171  
We can see here that the compromise the territorial nationalists made in the twenties between 
elimination and admiration and copying of the West, is still at work here, in 1938. On the one hand, 
Ḥusayn wants to eliminate European domination, for it caused much shame and humiliation for the 
Egyptians of his and previous generations. He wants to empower them by stressing the importance of 
their own country, the Arabic language and literature. On the other hand, the domination has to be cast 
off by using European ideals like the use of scholarly methods, equality and the notion that no nation 
from the outset is to be ruled, and no nation is destined to be a ruler. 
One can wonder then whether every European issue is to be regarded as positive and should function 
as a model for Egypt, and whether everything typically Egyptian should be relinquished. ‘No’, says 
Ḥusayn clearly, for he doesn’t approve of the European ‘evils’. He pleads for a selective approach to the 
European culture, and not ‘wholesale and indiscriminate borrowing’.172 What thereby shouldn’t be 
forgotten, Ḥusayn explains, is that this selective adopting already took place from the start of Islam: as 
soon as this religion crossed the Arabian frontiers, ‘it came into contact with foreign civilizations whose 
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relationship to the Muslims and Arabs at that time was the same as Europe’s is to us now.’173 The Muslim 
Arabs were not deterred by certain unpleasant features, and copied some other, positive features from 
the non-Muslim Persians and Byzantine Greeks. The features were incorporated into their own heritage, 
and contributed to ‘the glorious Islamic culture of the Ummayyads and Abbassids which our 
conservatives are seeking to recreate.’174 Therefore, religious life will not suffer from contact with 
Europe.  
So in what ‘nationalist category’ can we place Ḥusayn in the thirties and forties? I find that in these later 
decades, Ḥusayn can still be seen as a territorial nationalist, with certain (Arab nationalist) supra-
Egyptian tendencies. As we have seen, Ḥusayn in the twenties was an exemplary advocate of the 
territorial nationalism, basing Egypt’s nation-building on her geographical and ancient history. This line 
of thought is still very visible in The Future of Culture: Egypt is a Mediterranean nation, oriented towards 
the West, not to the East. In this work, Ḥusayn tried to combat the anti-Western ideas of many other 
Egyptianists of his time. Gershoni and Jankowski therefore call this work ‘the most prominent attempt 
to challenge the emerging Easternist paradigm in the 1930s.’175  
However, there are many supra-Egyptian changes noticeable in this and other works, most important 
of which is his emphasis on the Arab nation, Arab literature and Arab language. For example, Ḥusayn 
writes: ‘The Arabic language is not a foreign language for us. It is our language. It is a thousand and one 
times closer to us than the language of the ancient Egyptians.’176 And in The Future of Culture he writes 
about the Arabic language being ‘our national language’ and ‘a component shaping our patriotism and 
our national personality.’177 Ḥusayn finds that Arab cultural revival should play an important role in the 
education of the next generation (and exactly this he promotes when he starts working for Egypt’s 
Ministry of Education). Furthermore, wishing to promote the Arab cultural revival, he started from the 
thirties onwards to write books in the Islamiyyāt genre.178 In his In the Margin of the Prophet’s Tradition 
he notes that ‘nothing in the life of the ancients was worthwhile in and of itself; its entire importance 
was in what it could provide as inspiration for moderns.’179 In other words: modern Egyptian culture 
should be based on the foundation of the (Mediterranean/Arab) past. 
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Islam in Ḥusayn’s works doesn’t play the important role that it has for many supra-Egyptianists of his 
time. In fact, in 1933 he wrote in one of his columns that Egypt suffered ‘injustice’ and ‘aggression’ at 
the hands of various invading groups: ‘the Arabs included (it. AJ).’180 In other words: Ḥusayn equated 
the Muslim Arabs with ‘other invaders’ of Egypt, which caused fierce criticism. Ḥusayn refuted this by 
maintaining that he didn’t mean to say that he opposed Arab revival or unity. However, he wanted to 
show that the Arab rule over Egypt had originally been beneficial, but later ‘deteriorated into a mixture 
of good and bad, justice and injustice.’181 In that context a critique of The Future of Culture in Egypt 
wasn’t too long in coming. His opponents accused Ḥusayn of having ignored the tremendous influence 
of the Arabic language and that of Islam on the Egyptian nation: ‘it was these forces, rather than a more 
tangential linkage with the West, which were the determinants of Egyptian national culture and 
collective self-image.’182 As will become clear in the next chapters, Sayyid Quṭb criticizes Ḥusayn 
precisely on this point.  
 
2.4 A pro-Axis Egypt: ‘not every sulṭān is an amīr!’  
In this fourth section it is time to examine the ‘European evils’ and Ḥusayn’s attitude towards them. 
What was his response to Nazism? Did he redefine Egypt with the title: ‘A pro-Axis Egypt!’ or with ‘A 
pro-Axis Egypt?’. Furthermore: was there a connection between his response to Nazism and his 
nationalism, discussed in the previous paragraph? 
The question whether or not Ḥusayn had a pro-Axis Egypt in mind, will be dealt with first. We commence 
with the last part of his autobiography, A Passage to France, where Ḥusayn looks back on his life after 
1922. As to his political stance, he remarks: ‘I myself looked on neutrality at that time as both cowardly 
and hypocritical. The fact was that I was absorbed, any way, in politics, caught in its fires. Whatever the 
consequences might be, I would bear them. Ever since those days, has not my whole life taken its natural 
direction from my commitment to politics, my entire and ardent immersion in them?’183 These words, 
applied to the ‘pro-Axis?-question’ proved to be true: not every sulṭān was an amīr for Ḥusayn, and 
Hitler certainly was not. So to answer the question directly here at the outset of this section: Ṭāhā 
Ḥusayn didn’t imagine a pro-Axis Egypt, nor in fact did he remain neutral on this question (as the quote 
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above already indicates). Ḥusayn was one of the many Egyptian intellectuals who rejected Nazism point 
blank and who fought German totalitarianism intensely.  
On many occasions in his life this attitude becomes clear. For example, after the Berlin book burnings in 
the 1930s in which the Nazis destroyed ‘subversive’ books (written by, amongst others, Jewish authors), 
Ḥusayn called for international protests.184 In 1943, in the midst of the Second World War, he visited 
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, following an invitation by its President Judah Magnes. There he 
fiercely spoke out against Nazism, showing great empathy for the fate of the European Jews, who at the 
time were being persecuted and murdered by the Nazis.185 In November that same year, Ḥusayn held a 
lecture about Arab-Jewish relations at the Alexandria Jewish Community Centre. This was criticized for 
he did this at a time when the Palestine issue had become a hot item for the Egyptian public.186 
Furthermore, Ḥusayn helped Jewish scholars who were deprived of their jobs in Germany, by offering 
them a teaching position at the Cairo University and tried bringing them from Europe to Egypt.187 
Moreover, he dedicated himself to the magazine Al-Kātib al-Misrī (The Egyptian Writer), which was 
established by the Ashkenazi Harari family, and was published monthly by Ḥusayn. It was a liberal 
platform where Jewish, European and Arabic ideas and culture had their place. In a short time (1946-
1948) the magazine became one of the most important cultural magazines of Egypt. When war was 
waged in 1948, Ḥusayn was criticised for publishing a so-called Zionist magazine. However, he remained 
committed to the magazine, until the time the Harari family was forced to cancel further editions.188  
In these many deeds, a sharp protest is voiced against Nazism and the persecution of Jews in Europe. 
However, in this section I want to mainly focus on Ḥusayn’s own writings for Ḥusayn was, above all else, 
a writer. He was called ‘the doyen of modern Arabic literature’ for a reason! As a journalist he produced 
many articles in magazines and newspapers, as a scholar he wrote many academic writings and popular 
works, and as a novelist, he wrote many books. In many of these writings, an even fiercer rejection of 
Nazism and the persecution of Jews in Europe is visible.189 I would like two discuss two of these writings 
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– although very different in style – in this section. The first one is Ḥusayn’s novel From Cairo to Beirut 
(written in 1946), and the second is a book review of Hermann Rauschning’s work Hitler Told Me 
(published in 1939 and reviewed by Ḥusayn in March 1940). 
From Cairo to Beirut (1946) 
From Cairo to Beirut was published in the above-mentioned Jewish magazine al-Kātib al-Misrī in 1946.190 
The times were hectic: a few years earlier the Second World War had started, with major impact on 
Egypt and in 1945, Egypt had declared war on the Axis powers. In 1946 then, when the war was over, 
the Egyptians and the Arab world deeply wished for independence from the British. Furthermore, from 
1936 onwards Egypt had become deeply involved in the Palestine problem, and the relatively good 
relationship between Egyptian Muslims and Jews subsequently deteriorated in the second half of the 
thirties. Moreover, supra-Egyptian nationalism had become mainstream under the new effendiyya of 
Egypt who desired to redefine Egypt based on the Arab and Islamic past.  
In the midst of this situation, Ḥusayn wrote From Cairo to Beirut. The work is a literary travel log, and 
elaborates upon a boat journey to Beirut, the passengers on board and Beirut itself. The section of 
interest here is the imaginary arrival in the harbour of Haifa of a large group of refugees – European 
Jews. Although this section doesn’t play a prominent role in the continuation of the book, it does say a 
lot about Ḥusayn’s attitude towards the fate of the Jews in Europe and the situation in Palestine.191 He 
paints the horrific picture of the state of being of the refugees setting foot on Palestine:  
Haifa erreichten wir am nächsten Tag. Welch einen traurigen Anblick bot uns dieser Hafen. Eine Szene, 
die in der Seele Schmerzen, Wut, aber auch Zuneigung hervorrief. Ein Schiff trug etwa tausend 
geschwächte jüdische Einwanderer: Kinder und Knabe, die die Pubertät noch nicht erreicht hatten, und 
Frauen, denen schweres Leid zugefügt worden war.192 
He then turns to the Palestinians and explains that they didn’t ask for this situation, other places in the 
world exist where these Jews could be received, and find refuge and protection. Now they have to watch 
how British soldiers with their weapons exercise their power, guarding the harbour and making sure the 
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arrival of the poor refugees goes well. Palestine, according to Ḥusayn, is forced by the imperialists to 
give these people asylum.193 
Then comes the turning point in the story: the refugees start singing, with broken voices. Ḥusayn writes 
that he wondered about the reason why they did this, and then gives an answer: ‘Ich weiss nur, dass ihr 
Singen die Seelen [der arabischen Bewohner Palästinas] mit Wut und Zorn, aber auch mit Mitleid und 
Erbarmen erfüllte.’ At first, Ḥusayn explains, the Palestinian workers in the harbour feel angry and 
powerless; they criticize the power of the Allies who made it possible for a French boat to moor in Haifa 
allowing the group of Jews to move to Palestine. But then, he writes, when witnessing this heart-
breaking scene: ‘Der Kummer schwand und die Last auf den Herzen verflog.’194 
This section shows how Ḥusayn, in the midst of the anti-Palestinian sentiments of his days and the 
worsening of Arab-Jewish relations, makes a distinction between the empathy for Jewish Holocaust 
victims on the one hand, and the Jewish home in Israel and British occupation on the other. He isn’t too 
positive about the latter, but shows empathy for the former. Can we consider this fragment to be a plea 
to the Palestinians and other Arabs to have compassion for the Holocaust victims and their move to 
Palestine? Who knows. In any case, the Jews are described by Ḥusayn as victims of a horrible, unjust 
war and their fate in the hands of the Nazis as horrific – a sight that made ‘der Kummer schwand’ and 
the burden on the Palestinian hearts vanish.  
Review of Rauschning’s book Hitler Told Me (1940) 
An even more explicit rejection of Nazism is to be found in a review of the book Hitler Told Me, written 
by Hermann Rauschning in 1939. Rauschning was initially a member of the Nazi party, but later opposed 
its ideology. On March 18, 1940, Ḥusayn published this review (four years after the signing of the Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty, and two years after writing The Future of Culture in Egypt). The first lines of the review 
are:  
If you took it upon yourself to lift the lid concealing the conscience of that man, you would see that it is 
scarlet in colour, dripping with blood, even though he does not acknowledge the existence of an agency 
called the conscience. He maintains that to believe in it is mere illusion, to obey its injunctions mere 
weakness, and any compassion felt at the sight of blood mere folly. And if you opened his heart, you 
would see only a hard, impenetrable, unfeeling, inert rock, a sterile, crude block, cruel with a gratuitous 
cruelty.195 
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From what follows, it becomes perfectly clear: Ḥusayn speaks about Adolf Hitler here. Already in 1940, 
Ḥusayn harshly condemns him, for he has a conscience ‘dripping with blood’, he feels ‘no compassion’, 
he finds ‘nothing respectable or sacred’, and he is an ‘enemy of the spirit, humanity, of all the ideals of 
civilization’. Hitler knows ‘only instincts’, he is ‘pushed forward by a blind and stupid force’ and ‘will go 
wherever its wild fantasies lead it’ and he doesn’t have ‘any scruples about shutting down the 
universities, persecuting scholars, in order to place scholarship and instruction in his exclusive 
service.’196  
Furthermore, Ḥusayn writes, Hitler thinks he has come into existence to lead Germany, and with it the 
world, toward a new phase of their destiny: ‘Every means can be used to that end, whatever the 
difficulties and obstacles.’197 As to that last note, Ḥusayn mentions the many sacrifices that are made, 
in Hitler’s attempts to achieve his goals of German world domination: the vanishing of one’s 
individuality, the suffering of hunger and death, thousands of atrocities, and the killing of millions:  
The individual exists only insofar as he places himself in the service of the German people. What does it 
matter if he suffers from hunger, thirst, woes of every kind? What does it matter if he is sacrificed, if he 
dies or is subjected to a thousand atrocities, provided the Hitlerian regime takes root in Germany? What 
does it matter if millions of others are also sacrifices so that German domination of the world can be 
established?198 
Next, Ḥusayn points to the origins of the disaster of Hitler’s power: the lack of instruction and a 
neglected education. These causes produce ‘despicable results in some individuals, who take advantage 
of a crisis situation to seize power and to exercise it in a despotic manner.’199 Moreover, Ḥusayn notes 
that another lesson to be learnt is that true civilization cannot be found in material progress of for 
example industry, commerce or scientific research. Above all, civilization is to be found in a morality 
‘diffusing itself to souls, hearts and intelligences: one that prepares them to resist evil and to shun it.’200 
In his concluding notes, Ḥusayn tells how he ‘gives thanks to God’ that he didn’t wait until the 
declaration of war to hate Hitler and his regime, but that he had hated them since the moment they 
made their appearance. He calls his readers to stand up against Hitler and Nazism as well, ‘and to 
mobilize every resource against both so that humanity may one day recover its civilization intact and its 
conscience in integrity.’201  
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From these two selected writings, but also from other writings and events in his life, it becomes clear 
that Ṭāhā Ḥusayn rejected Nazism and the persecution and murdering of many Jews as a consequence. 
Israel Gershoni writes in Beyond Anti-Semitism that Ḥusayn furthermore was concerned about the 
destruction of intellectual pluralism and cultural heterogeneity by Nazism. He was afraid of people being 
pushed to speak with only one voice, and to be completely submissive to the will of the state, or better: 
to the Führer.202 We have come across this fear in Ḥusayn’s review of Hitler Told Me, in which he wrote 
that the individual exists only insofar as he places himself in the service of the German people. Gershoni 
adds that Ḥusayn understood very well that individual creators in the totalitarian regimes had lost their 
own individual artistic personalities and were absorbed by the impersonal, national collective.203 In 
other words: ‘Ḥusayn viewed the totalitarian regimes in Italy and Germany as anti-humanistic and 
indeed, anti-cultural, and at “total war” with human civilization as it developed from the Enlightenment 
onwards.’204 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
202 Gershoni, Beyond Anti-Semitism, 15. Gershoni refers not to the review of Hitler Told Me, but to another essay 
published on the 1st of February 1937 in Al-Hilāl, where Ḥusayn established a division between the German and 
Italian ‘camp of cultural destruction’ and ‘the democratic camp’, which was a camp friendly to democratic, 
pluralistic culture, and where genuine intellectual and artistic creations could take shape. Ḥusayn’s thesis was 
clear: ‘Only in a “democratic environment” could an individual creator find the freedom and independence 
necessary to defend his individual autonomy of thought and creation (…). In a “fascist environment”, on the 
contrary, creators and thinkers were programmed to create, think and work exclusively for the collective ideals 
and goals of the state or nation, “goals” which were considered “divine”’ (ibid.). 
203 Idem, 15. 
204 Idem, 16. 
  42 
CHAPTER THREE 
Sayyid Quṭb: blinded by hatred? 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss Sayyid Quṭb, a controversial Egyptian intellectual, who maintained a very 
different vision on nationalism than did his contemporary Ṭāhā Ḥusayn. Quṭb’s radical writings inspired 
Osama bin Laden, who was a disciple of Muḥammad Quṭb (Sayyid’s brother) in Jedda. Bin Laden 
familiarized himself with Sayyid Quṭb’s writings between 1974 and 1978 and incorporated these later 
texts in his training programs in all the camps that he established in Afghanistan.205 In an attempt to 
understand Quṭb’s concerns, fears, and hopes, I will briefly present his biography in the following 
section, looking specifically at the way his life took shape against the background of the Egyptian and 
world events described in chapter one. Next, in 3.3, I will discuss Quṭb’s reconceptualization of the 
‘future of culture of Egypt’ and its diversion from that of Ḥusayn. Finally, in the last section I will explain 
the role played by the Axis in his redefinition of the Egyptian nation.  
3.2 Biography: becoming a foreigner in the world 
Sayyid Quṭb’s life (1906-1966) ‘unfolded against the backdrop of one of the most colourful and eventful 
periods in modern Egyptian history’, John Calvert correctly states in his book Sayyid Quṭb and the Origins 
of Radical Islamism.206 Sayyid Quṭb too collected his memories of this period of time in A Child from the 
Village. In what follows I will draw on Quṭb’s account of his Egyptian childhood, as I did in the case of 
Ḥusayn. 
Sayyid Quṭb was indeed ‘a child from the village’: he was born in 1906 in the village Mushā, located in 
Upper Egypt, about 160 kilometres south of Cairo. About forty years later, in 1945 and 1946, he wrote 
his memoirs. Meanwhile, he had become a prominent member of the secular intellectual and literary 
elite. He was a poet and literary critic, and an author who wrote on educational and social matters.207 
In other words, he was a ‘Muslim Everyman’:208 an average Egyptian effendi, without any extreme 
opinions – yet. In his forties, a few years after having written his memoirs, Quṭb turned to Islamist 
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ideology, for which he is mostly known today. In A Child from the Village, however, this ideology has not 
yet crystallized.  
In his memoirs Sayyid Quṭb describes his life from the time he was six years old up until the time he left 
the village for Cairo at the age of fifteen. We learn that he was born in the sort of family that was able 
to participate in and profit from the modernization of Egypt.209 Both his parents came from respected 
families in the village. Sayyid’s father was an educated man, ‘who read the press and subscribed to the 
daily newspaper. And he was a member of the village committee of the Nationalist Party.’210 Later on in 
his memoirs we learn that Sayyid’s father was forced to sell parts of the family’s land in order to cover 
their debts.211 Sayyid’s mother hoped that by sending her son to the new state elementary school where 
he was enrolled at age six, Sayyid would become an effendi, and the family fortunes would be 
restored.212  
John Calvert in his Translator’s Introduction points to Quṭb’s concern for social justice expressed in 
Islamic terms in A Child from the Village.213 This concern would become an important feature of his later 
more radical Islamist ideology, on which I will elaborate below. The most striking example of this concern 
I found in Quṭb’s empathy for a group of ‘poor foreigners that would come every year to work in the 
fields’ of his family.214 He cared deeply for these miserable workers, and made sure they were all right.215 
In the final pages of his memoirs, Quṭb remarks:  
He [Quṭb] learned many things, whose profound effects on his soul and whose harsh impact on his 
feelings have only become evident as he now reflects on them from time to time, and feels shame in the 
depth of his soul and contempt for himself and his people. He is a robber. He has robbed these 
‘foreigners’ and many millions like them who create the wealth of the Nile Valley yet go hungry. He is a 
robber! (…) This was the feeling that always kept coming over him whenever he sat down to eat rich food 
or sweet fruit or luxurious sweets or whenever he enjoyed the simple pleasures of life amidst the millions 
of deprived.216 
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Furthermore, Calvert explains how below the surface Quṭb calls for a reform and modernization of the 
village. The sacred state school that he had attended was a step in the right direction, but Quṭb has 
many more improvements in mind, especially in the areas of land reform and health care. However, 
when the British-dominated government implemented modernization strategies, the villagers did not 
often appreciate this, since their sensibilities and social and economic realities weren’t taken into 
account.217 In other words: modernization is not always a good thing. It has problematic aspects and 
can lead to psychological, social and cultural stresses.218 In his memoirs, Quṭb teaches his readers that, 
whereas the village formerly perceived the government as remote, the British-dominated government 
imposed new structures of criminal law and agricultural administration, and intervened regularly in local 
village affairs.219  
Samia Kholoussi in Fallahin: The  Mud Bearers of Egypt’s Liberal Age shares another insight, noting that 
Quṭb shows deep compassion for the peasants in his depiction of their servitude to the unsympathetic 
urban officials appointed to inspect, discipline, and administer the villagers.220 The ‘life-style gap 
between the urban and the rural constituted a common feature of Quṭb’s discourse’, according to 
Kholoussi.221 A case in point of the state negatively interfering with village affairs is that of the 
government’s confiscation of village weapons. Quṭb describes the event as follows: 
The village woke up terrified by the neighing of horses, the clatter of weapons, and the heavy steps of 
soldiers who were occupying the whole area. (…) It was a campaign for the confiscation of weapons! A 
campaign of 200 soldiers led by an officer who had pledged to the authorities that he would confiscate 
arms from all of the villages of the province. (…) Bullets began to resound about their heads: (…) these 
bullets were meant to terrorize, confuse, and unnerve. (…) More than a quarter of a century has passed 
since that incident. But the child still remembers it as if it happened yesterday. Like every child, man, and 
woman, he had been terrified.222  
Furthermore, a process in which Quṭb respectfully distanced himself from the village and ‘the village 
way of thinking’ can be detected in Quṭb’s memoirs: an ‘awakening’ if you will. A striking example of this 
awakening is the topic of the ‘afārīt (singular: ‘ifrīt): the ‘demons’ who were thought to haunt 
uninhabited or isolated locations. Quṭb dedicated one whole chapter in A Child from the Village to these 
beings. He writes that ‘the naïve village imagination explained phenomena and events in terms of deeply 
rooted images and phantoms, frightening and mysterious the dark gloom.’223 Quṭb and his family 
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participated in this village imagination ascribing the death of his baby brother to the ‘afārīt. He describes 
that later on however, after being introduced to the ‘Great Tradition’ of texts and theological schools,224 
he left behind village superstition and learnt that the death of his brother was in fact caused by a tetanus 
infection.225 Although Quṭb experienced ‘enlightenment’, he could not and would not leave the village 
mindset behind: you can take the boy out of the village, but you can’t take the village out of the boy, 
one could say. Quṭb writes that he would always remain a child from the village: 
Days passed. He left everything in the village and lived his life in the city and broadened his education. 
The myth of the ‘afārīt became a source of amusement and jest. But inquire of his dreams and visions 
today. They will tell you that the myth of the ‘afārīt is more deeply embedded in his soul than education, 
and that the ‘afārīt that inhabited his mind in childhood and youth will inhabit his imagination forever.226 
As for the attitude towards Britain in A Child from the Village, Quṭb tells how as a young boy he was 
already a proponent of Egypt’s struggle for independence. He describes how, by the time he had 
reached school age, the demands for Egyptian independence had become commonplace. His father 
shared these feelings: as a young boy he would see that supporters of the Nationalist Party would gather 
at the family house to discuss politics and the resistance to Britain, and he felt that ‘something was going 
to happen.’227 Indeed, in 1919, something did happen: the First Revolution took place. Quṭb ‘exploded 
in enthusiasm’, Sa‘d Zaghlūl was heralded as a hero, and Quṭb delivered his patriotic poetry to 
whomever was prepared to listen.228 
Quṭb’s memoirs end when, at the age of fifteen, he travelled to Cairo to attend secondary school. We 
learn how this shift was delayed because of Revolution, because of major demonstrations against British 
rule and in support of nationalist Sa‘d Zaghlūl.229 In Cairo, Quṭb lived with his uncle who was a journalist, 
and completed secondary school. From 1929 onwards he attended the teacher training institution Dār 
al-‘Ulūm, which can be characterized as the middle way between the traditional education of the Azhar, 
and the modern University of Cairo (both of which Ḥusayn had attended). Quṭb studied Arabic language 
and literature, English and several other subjects and graduated in 1933.230 
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In that same year his father died. How then, should the 27-year old Sayyid support his family? His answer 
must have been: ‘by remaining on my career path.’231 After his graduation, Quṭb joined the Ministry of 
Education, a job offered by none other than Ṭāhā Ḥusayn. Quṭb first worked as a teacher of elementary 
school for seven years, initially in Cairo and then in the provinces.232 The troubles created by the Second 
World War didn’t hinder him from advancing his career: in 1940, the Ministry promoted him to the 
office of General Culture, and a month later to the office of Translation and Statistics. In 1944 however, 
Quṭb was demoted to the rank of school inspector. John Calvert suggests that the reason for this was 
Quṭb’s increasingly negative attitude towards the Wafd: ‘in Old Regime Egypt, political affiliation could 
impact one’s social standing.’233 Only after a full year was Quṭb allowed to return to the General Culture 
office.234  Moreover, Sayyid Quṭb had become an effendi: he had lived up to his mother’s wish.235   
As a ‘poet and man of letters’, Quṭb published his first article in a literary journal in 1924, and in the next 
decades, he wrote more than 130 poems, 500 articles and essays, and nine books,236 all in the fields of 
literary, social and political criticism.237 As for his political criticism, John Calvert writes: ‘After the Second 
World War, (…) Sayyid Quṭb and many others in his circle began to speak out forcefully and passionately 
for full national independence and social justice against the continuing European imperialism and the 
political corruption, social stress, and economic inequality that would soon bring about the collapse of 
the old regime.’238 It was in these years that Quṭb published his memoirs, in which social reform 
concerns lie very close to the surface.  
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In his early years in Cairo, Quṭb had become a member of the Wafd party. Later on, he shifted to the 
Sa’dist party, because he was very disappointed with the Wafd’s willingness to cooperate with Britain – 
especially after the February 4th Incident.239 However, Quṭb became increasingly critical of the political 
regime, which in his eyes was incapable of resolving Egypt’s problematic relationship with colonial 
power Great Britain, diminishing the gap between rich and poor in Egypt, and supporting the Arabs in 
Palestine.240 From 1945 onwards, he therefore belonged to no party.  
It may well be that his critique of the political establishment was the reason for him being sent on a 
study tour to the United States from November 1948 to August 1950.241 Calvert writes how ‘it is 
variously claimed that he was sent on this tour to avoid being arrested for his views, to get him out of 
the way, and to expose him directly to the West in the hopes that this exposure would moderate his 
opinions.’242 This last goal was not realized. On the contrary: his negative opinions regarding the 
imperialist West only became stronger. What Quṭb encountered in the United States was – from his 
point of view – a low moral and cultural state of its people. Calvert writes how Quṭb returned to Egypt 
‘all the more set in the direction his life had begun to move. This direction was toward Islamic 
activism.’243  
Matthias Küntzel defines Islamism as ‘a system of ideas which reads everything that happens according 
to a binary logic: everywhere, the embattled “good” (Islam) is engaged in an existential struggle with 
“evil”.’244 The only option is to eradicate the evil opponent. ‘Because the world is divided into “us” and 
“them”, a homogeneous community is created, which gives a certain form of security and identity.’245 
As we will see below, this definition applies to Sayyid Quṭb’s way of thinking. 
Although Quṭb had written about Islam and the Qur’ān before, one cannot say that his writings before 
1948 are ideologically Islamist writings (Quṭb would describe himself as ‘irreligious’ during this 
period).246  
                                                             
239 Calvert, Origins of Radical Islamism, 104. 
240 Idem, 11. 
241 Calvert, Translators’ Introduction, xviii. 
242 Idem, xviii, xix. 
243 Idem, xix. 
244 Küntzel, 99. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Calvert, Translators’ Introduction, xix. Although A Child from the Village cannot be regarded an Islamist book, 
it can be regarded as an important step towards Quṭb’s Islamist path. James Toth sees various principles in 
Quṭb’s memoirs that would continue to guide the thinking of the later, Islamist Sayyid Quṭb. Toth mentions (1) 
the faith in ancestors as a source of pride and wisdom, that contrasts sharply with today’s corrupt and immoral 
leaders who toss out traditional values, (2) the belief in the inherent goodness of his ordinary countrymen who 
are oppressed by unjust tyrannical governments, (3) an elitism that promotes an Islamist vanguard in contrast to 
the ‘little people’ of Egypt’s villagers, and (4) the need to anchor one’s identity in the authentic traditions of 
Egyptian society (Toth, 53, 54). 
  48 
His first Islamist book was Social Justice in Islam, which was published just after he went to the United 
States in 1948.247 In this book, the same demands for social justice become manifest as in his memoirs, 
but now they are given a clear Islamic foundation: Quṭb calls for a society governed by Islamic norms. 
However he is still prepared to cooperate with secularists for common social and political goals.248 Later 
on, this willingness to cooperate with those who disagree with the Islamists will disappear, as will 
become clear when discussing his famous work Milestones. 
When Sayyid Quṭb returned to Egypt after his stay in the United States, he joined the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1951. This organisation was composed of ‘new effendiyya’, with ‘a middle-class, urban 
and primarily Western-educated core.’249 The fact that Sayyid Quṭb joined the Brotherhood should not 
be surprising: both shared the belief that Islamic moral reform and the implementation of Islamic laws 
are necessary in the redefinition of Egypt. Quṭb didn’t only join the Brotherhood – he became one of its 
leading ideologues, writing many articles in its journals,250 and taking charge of the Brotherhood’s 
‘Propagation of the Call Department’, one of the most important offices of the organization that ‘in 
order to maintain doctrinal purity and organizational harmony, had the final say on anything published 
in the name of the Brotherhood.’251 Furthermore, Quṭb supported the Free Officers coup in 1952, as did 
the Muslim Brothers, and resigned from the Ministry of Education in 1952.252  
In fact, Gamal Nasser offered Sayyid Quṭb a variety of senior government posts, albeit in vain.253 As 
already described in chapter two, the Muslim Brotherhood had a falling out with the government which 
escalated into an attempt to assassinate Nasser in October 1954. The Brotherhood was banned, some 
of its leaders were executed, and many others, including Quṭb, were imprisoned. Most of the rest of his 
life he would spend in prison. There he continued his writing, which became increasingly radically 
Islamist. Calvert notes that ‘it is generally assumed that the harsh conditions and torture that he and 
others suffered contributed in a major way to this radicalism.’254  
In prison, Quṭb’s faith deepened: ‘Cut off from the distraction of everyday life, with only the Qur’ān and 
other Muslim Brothers to keep him company, his faith assumed a calm certainty unencumbered by 
                                                             
247 Calvert, Translators’ Introduction, xix. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Gershoni, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 15. 
250 Calvert, Translators’ Introduction, xix, xx. 
251 Calvert, Origins of Radical Islamism, 187. 
252 Calvert, Translators’ Introduction, xix, xx. 
253 Küntzel, 68. 
254 Calvert, Translators’ Introduction, xx. 
  49 
sentiments of pride and personal ambition.’255 Quṭb felt like a ‘foreigner in the world’, and realized that 
his punishment had a ‘larger purpose’ and was leading to ‘some kind of dramatic conclusion.’256  
In May 1964, Quṭb was released from prison, but was rearrested a few months later, because he was 
accused of plotting against the government. At this point in his life, Quṭb had become an extremely 
radical Islamist.257  
Quṭb’s hardened vision becomes visible in his book Milestones, which was published during his few 
months of freedom. Milestones brings forward an urge to follow the will of God according to Islamic 
Holy Scriptures whatever the cost (rather than the emphasis on social reform which Quṭb carried out 
earlier on in his life).258 The existing order in all countries, including Muslim countries, was regarded by 
Quṭb as jāhilī, i.e. ‘ignorant’ (referring to the ‘barbaric’ order before Islam took over Arabia). Quṭb called 
Islamic activists to jihād (literally ‘striving’): ‘to fight against the jāhilī forces that were responsible for 
mankind’s misery and confusion, and to replace the ignorant governments by a truly Islamic 
theocracy.’259 Cooperating with the barbaric secularists was clearly not an option anymore. Through 
jihād Muslims would attain their freedom: not the freedom of the West (i.e. the individual’s autonomy), 
but the freedom that comes with ‘the realization of one’s God-given nature.’260 Furthermore, in 
Milestones it becomes clear that faith for Quṭb was most important in life. In fact, it was more important 
than life itself. Death he regarded no longer as a punishment, but as a means to the reward attained in 
the afterlife. Martyrdom for Quṭb therefore was something to strive after.261  
His radicalism and his role in militant action against the state led to his second conviction (although the 
degree to which Quṭb actually advocated concrete militant action remains unclear).262 The dramatic 
conclusion of his life, his execution, took place on August 29, 1966. Milestones was the only 
documentary evidence against him at his trial.263 The book and its author received an enormous 
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following: Quṭb was regarded a martyr and his book an inspiration for radical Islamist groups including 
Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic State.  
 
3.3 Quṭb’s view of the Egyptian nation 
Quṭb didn’t ‘accidentally’ write a work like Ḥusayn’s An Egyptian Childhood, that even bore a similar 
title. No, Quṭb was encouraged by Ḥusayn’s The Days to choose the same vehicle for ‘oftentimes similar 
encounters with the forces of change.’264 Moreover, he dedicated A Child from the Village to this 
intellectual, and wrote the following preface directed to ‘Dr. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn Bey’ (the title ‘Bey’ being a 
honorific title used in Egypt to address superiors):265  
To the author of The Days, Dr. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn Bey. These, dear sir, are ‘days’ like your ‘days’, lived by a 
village child, some are similar to your days and some are different. The difference reflects the difference 
between one generation and another, one village and another, one life and another, indeed the 
difference between one nature and another, between one attitude and another. But they are, when all 
is said and done, also ‘days’.266 
Why would Sayyid Quṭb incorporate this in his memoirs? Was Ḥusayn his master, a friend maybe, and 
did the two intellectuals have similar ideas? According to James Toth in his book Sayyid Qutb. The Life 
and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual this was not the case. On the contrary, actually: Quṭb’s goal 
by writing this preface and the whole of his memoirs was a subtle way to criticize ‘Dr. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn Bey’. 
In Quṭb’s eyes, Ḥusayn in his autobiography belittled and disdained the village of his youth, showing it 
in an unfavourable light and mocking it. Quṭb however wanted to spread a counter message of feeling 
proud of the Egyptian village and its inhabitants.267  
Bluntly criticizing the respected intellectual however, was not done. Therefore Quṭb’s ‘approach was to 
mimic Ḥusayn’s The Days – using many of Ḥusayn’s literary flourishes and style – but departing from his 
perspective in subtle but significant ways.’268 I detected these subtle ways of arguing with Ḥusayn in 
several instances in A Child from the Village. Whereas Ḥusayn has more of a ridiculing style (he argues 
that nothing good is to be found in the village: only in the West can improvement be found), Quṭb speaks 
                                                             
264 Calvert, Translators’ Introduction, xxiii. 
265 Toth, 303. Toth writes that Ṭāhā Ḥusayn lived from 1889 to 1973 and concludes that ‘the two intellectuals 
were not necessarily from different generations in the strict sense. The difference may well lie in each 
intellectual’s worldview’ (ibid.). 
266Calvert, Translators’ Introduction, iv. 
267 Toth, 52. 
268 Ibid.  
  51 
with respect and love for the village, although he does see many issues that need improvement.269 The 
village is a place to be proud of, as Toth writes: ‘Quṭb supported a national community that was based 
on the humour, honesty, and determination of the peasants and petit bourgeois entrepreneurs of the 
village.’270 The village stands in contrast to the decadent city, where the opposite is found. Quṭb wants 
his readers to understand that tradition needs to be cherished and not crossed out by Western 
influence, in order to modernize. Staying and reforming the Egyptian, Eastern, Islamic civilization, is the 
only way to do Egypt justice and respect her people. 
Quṭb had already ‘argued’ against Ḥusayn a decade prior to A Child from the Village when commenting 
on Ḥusayn’s book The Future of Culture in Egypt. Ḥusayn in this study called for an embrace of Europe 
in the process of redefining Egypt, for she is in fact part of the West. Although Quṭb agreed with Ḥusayn 
on educational matters, not surprisingly he disagreed with the foundations of Ḥusayn’s view: Quṭb 
criticized thinkers who tried to fit ‘round pegs of Islam into the square holes of Europe.’271 He didn’t 
believe neither in Europe’s superiority nor in the weak position of the Muslim world.272 This becomes 
clear in the abovementioned book Social Justice in Islam as well. Here, Quṭb addresses Ḥusayn again. 
He finds that copying the West emanates from a feeling of Egyptian inferiority.  He writes that ‘Dr. Ṭāhā 
Ḥusayn’ and others: 
believe that they are contributing a new access of strength to Islam when they connect it with other 
systems. But in reality all that they are doing is an error, spoiling Islam and ruining its spirit that it cannot 
operate. And at the same time this is the product of a hidden feeling of inferiority, even though such 
writers may not openly mention the word inferiority.273  
For Sayyid Quṭb in the thirties and forties, and even more so in the fifties and sixties, the Egyptian 
mentality is not at all Western, as Ḥusayn proposed; Egypt is not a component of Hellenic-based, 
Mediterranean civilization, and never has been.274 Instead, Egypt has an Eastern identity. This becomes 
clear for example when it comes to Eastern spirituality. Whereas Westerners explain the mind in strictly 
psychological terms and Western spirituality is an illusory spirituality that is always subordinated to the 
sphere of the material,275 Egyptians and other Easterners have a true spiritual system, in which intuition, 
spiritual insight and deep feeling are present. The advent of the Qur’ān provided this Eastern spirituality 
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with an important practical direction.276 Where Ḥusayn claimed that the imported religions of 
Christianity and Islam hadn’t affected their adopting societies to any considerable degree,277 Quṭb 
disagreed – and he became an even stronger opponent once he adopted the Islamist ideology: Islam 
had had and still has a great impact on the Egyptian psyche.278  
Quṭb holds that, because she has an Eastern identity, Egypt should foster closer ties with her Arab 
neighbours. She should play an important role in leading other Arabic-speaking and Muslim countries 
to their reawakening.279 Furthermore, Quṭb stood by his Arab brothers and sisters in Palestine. He had 
supported the Palestinian rebellion of 1936-1939, and he called for governmental and private forces to 
stop Israel’s declaration of independence and Zionist expansion beyond its original territory.280 Later on, 
especially in the fifties and sixties, Quṭb would advocate that Egypt needs to support Palestine in the 
struggle against Israel more intensely: he believed that imperialism had torn up the unity of the Islamic 
world, as exemplified by the State of Israel.281  
In Quṭb’s view, Egypt should turn away from the West, for Europe only wants to conquer the world by 
colonizing it (Israel is the latest example of this urge), and thereby extinguish the spirit of Islam, which 
is, according to Quṭb, an inheritance of the Crusader’s hatred.282 In particular, Quṭb accused England of 
taking ‘a more devious and tortuous road to the same end in Egypt’: the road of education, which 
‘encouraged the growth of a general frame of mind which would despise the bases of Islamic life.’283 
Overall, Quṭb finds that Egyptians should have enough self-confidence to realize that they don’t need 
Europe: instead, they should retain and renew their Eastern, Arab and Islamic culture,284 for the Islamic 
system is a system that stands by itself, and is independent of other systems.285 
In the fifties and especially the sixties, his attitude towards the West became harsher, and more agitated 
and violent in tone. In Milestones, the division between the Self and the Other (which had been present 
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earlier on in his thinking as we have seen above) sharpened. Whereas in the previous decades he ‘only’ 
made a division between the virtuous Muslim Easterners and the self-centred Westerners, he now 
thought in theological harsh categories of Islam vs. jāhilīyya (as described above).286 In the long period 
of Muslim history the jāhilī West had made many efforts to invade and conquer Muslim lands, and to 
force them to submit to European rulers, instead of worshipping God.287 Quṭb describes in Milestones: 
If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world 
is steeped in jāhilīyyah (ignorance of the Divine guidance), and all the marvellous material comforts and 
high level inventions do not diminish this Ignorance. This jāhilīyyah is based on rebellion against God’s 
sovereignty on earth. (…) Our whole environment, people’s beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and 
laws – is jāhilīyyah, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic 
philosophy and Islamic thought, are also constructs of jāhilīyya.288 
Quṭb in Milestones wants to assure his readers that they should not despair, for the jāhilī powers in this 
world are not as powerful as they appear, and Islam is not as weak as the religion may seem. He believes 
that when Muslims return to the Islamic Holy Scriptures, and when jāhilīyya powers are overthrown, a 
Muslim revival will set in and Islam will prevail.289 
James Toth paints a clear picture of the life and development of Sayyid Quṭb’s thinking: Quṭb lived in a 
time of turmoil:290 the Great Depression, a variety of corrupt government institutions, continued British 
occupation, a post-World War II recession and political chaos, the republican revolution in 1952 and the 
revolutionary government’s harsh consolidation of power.291 Especially the outbreak of the Second 
World War, which had brought many British soldiers, symbols of foreign power, to Cairo, greatly 
affected Quṭb.292 To this list of Egyptian turmoil, the defeat in the war against Israel in 1948 need be 
added: another deeply humiliating experience for many Egyptians. Quṭb concluded that his country was 
in trouble, that the Western oriented modernity had failed, and that the only solution was for Egypt to 
rely on her own authentic system: Islam. This system Quṭb developed over the period of 33 years: from 
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1933, the year he graduated from Dār al-‘Ulūm, to 1966, the year he was executed by the Egyptian 
government.293  
It is indeed clear that this system developed over time: one should differentiate between Sayyid Quṭb’s 
attitude in the 1930s and 1940s on the one hand, and the 1950s and 1960s on the other.  
In the early decades Quṭb was, as already stated above, a new effendi. Like many of his fellow effendis, 
Quṭb was a supra-Egyptian nationalist who came from the rural, anti-British communities to the city 
(Cairo), experienced troubles and attributed this to a conflict between East and West. Quṭb rejected 
Ḥusayn’s territorial nationalism with a positive focus on the West, for Western strategies weren’t able 
to prevent Egypt from experiencing turmoil. Quṭb started off as a modern secularist who as a writer and 
poet promoted the principles of freedom, justice and equality. From a young age onwards he was an 
anti-imperialist who called for complete Egyptian independence. In his redefinition of Egypt he focused 
increasingly on the Muslim-Arabic heritage all Easterners shared. When Egypt would rely on this Islamic 
heritage, she would regain her confidence of which the West had deprived her.  
Quṭb experienced a process of a deeper understanding of Islam during the fifties and sixties. This of 
course influenced his vision of the future of culture in Egypt, a vision that became increasingly Islamic 
and extended beyond the borders of Egypt. This type of nationalism can best be characterized as ‘supra-
Egyptian’; the type of nationalism I described elaborately in chapter one. No longer did Quṭb strive ‘only’ 
for Egyptian independence. Instead, he called for a greater liberation of the entire Muslim world,294 for 
he believed that ‘there is no nationality for a Muslim except his creed which makes him a member of 
the Islamic ummah in the Abode of Islam.’295 Quṭb based this new understanding on the teachings of 
the Qur’ān and the example of the Prophet. He found that the Islamic vocabulary, codes and symbols 
he used to voice his discontent were untouched by the West, and were truly ‘Eastern’. They provided 
Egypt with her raison d’être: she existed not as slave of the jāhilī West, but as a (leading) country in the 
Abode of Islam.  
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3.4 A pro-Axis Egypt: servants of God 
Attitude towards Jews 
In this last section of this chapter we hope to discover Sayyid Quṭb’s response to Nazism. In order to do 
so we need first to enquire about Quṭb’s attitude towards Jews, since Nazism and Jews were strongly 
connected in his thought. 
In contrast to what one might expect, I noticed that in Social Justice in Islam and in other works296 Quṭb 
stresses that Islam is in fact a very tolerant religion: equality of mankind is prescribed, and discrimination 
between men, or superiority of one over another is forbidden. He writes, for example: 
‘People are all equal as the teeth of a comb’, says the noble Prophet of Islam. This equality extends its 
compass over all mankind, and transcends both patriotism and religion; for, since the Messenger said, 
‘All Muslims are of one blood’, Islam grants to men of other faiths right of blood equivalent to those 
enjoyed by Believers – so long as there is a compact between them and the Muslims. (…) Thus Islam was 
freed from the conflict of tribal and racial and religious loyalties, and thus it achieved an equality which 
civilization in the West has not gained to this day.297  
Moreover, in this same book Quṭb endorses the traditional dhimmi construction, which provides dhimmi 
Jews and Christians – People of the Book – living under Muslim rule with protection, in exchange for 
their payment of the jizya (i.e. the poll tax) to the Muslim state. By this contract, Jews and Christians are 
given ‘full human rights’298 because of their dhimmi status and poll tax payment, and they are ‘granted 
the fullest freedom and protection in conducting their religious rites.’299 Quṭb sees the jizya as ‘a symbol 
of submission’, and finds it ‘a sign that there is no opposition to the doctrines of Islam’. It is also a ‘symbol 
of Islam’s universal tolerance.’300 However, in some cases Quṭb’s tone turns harsher: he finds that 
People of the Book ought to become Muslim, and ‘that to retain their original religion was just plain 
jāhilī folly.’301 Toth describes how Quṭb grudgingly recognized that the hierarchical dhimmi status could 
allow them to retain their religion, if only they didn’t turn into Crusaders or Zionists, which would mean 
they had violated the dhimmi contract whereby Muslims were allowed to wage jihād against them.302 
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In his later work Milestones, Quṭb describes Jews as but one of the many jāhilī forces: just as there are 
jāhilī communist societies and Muslim jāhilī societies, there are also Jewish and Christian jāhilī societies. 
As to this last category, Quṭb writes: 
All the Jewish and Christian societies today are also jāhilī societies. They have distorted the original beliefs 
and ascribe certain attributes of God to other beings. This association with God has taken many forms, 
such as the Sonship of God or the Trinity; sometimes it is expressed in a concept of God which is remote 
from the true reality of God. (…) ‘The Jews say: “Ezra is the Son of God”, and the Christians say: “The 
Messiah is the Son of God.” These are mere sayings from their mouths, following those who preceded 
them and disbelieved. God will assail them; how they are perverted.’(Q9:30)303 
However – and unfortunately – his attitude towards Jews turned even more vicious, for Quṭb didn’t 
‘only’ see Jews as People of the Book and dhimmis, nor as one of many jāhilī societies. Quṭb ascribed 
another far more significant role to Jews: that of the embodiment of evil – a role that had everything to 
do with his fundamentalist, Islamist worldview.  
In most of his writings Quṭb doesn’t pay much attention to Jews and Israel.304 In his books Social Justice 
in Islam and Milestones for example we find ‘only’ a few negative references.305 In his work In the Shade 
of the Qur’ān there are already more allusions.306 One work however stands out regarding this matter. 
It is called Our Struggle with the Jews and was written around 1955, the time Quṭb joined the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which was in its core an anti-Jewish, and not an anti-Zionist, movement.307 
In this pamphlet his Islamist view of Jews becomes particularly clear. Above, I have described Islamism 
as a system of beliefs wherein everything that happens is read with a binary logic: the good that is 
struggling against evil. ‘The good’ in Quṭb’s mind obviously is Islam. ‘The evil’, for the largest part of his 
life, was occupied by the self-centred, materialist, and atheist West. In the fifties, and thus in Our 
Struggle with the Jews, this last category received a narrower and more detailed form. Küntzel strikingly 
                                                             
303 Quṭb, Milestones, 150. 
304 This is also noted by Emmanuel Sivan who writes: ‘Sayyid Quṭb himself paid only scant attention to Israel, 
although when he did so he made ample use of his vast knowledge of the Qur’ān to conjure up the image of an 
essentially depraved Judaism, an age-old enemy of Islam. All his writings on Judaism and Israel amount however, 
to but one small booklet Our Struggle with the Jews’ (Sivan, E. Radical Islam and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, in: 
Curtis, M. Antisemitism in the Contemporary World (Colorado, 1986)).  
305 See for example Social Justice, 63, 64 and Milestones, 207. 
306 Quṭb writes for example in In the Shade of the Qur’ān: ‘In reality, for fourteen centuries Jews have formed a 
compact mass, at war against Islam and Muslims through diverse subterfuges. European imperialism, then 
modern American imperialism, has Jews at its origins’ (Carré O. Mysticism and Politics. A Critical Reading of Fī 
Zilāl al-Qur’ān by Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966) (Leiden, 2003), 107).  
307 Laqueur, W. The Changing Face of Antisemitism (New York, 2006), 198. Küntzel writes that especially from 
1936 onwards the Brotherhood saw the Jews as the main enemy: ‘Passages from the Koran on the alleged 
inferiority of the Jews were mingled with frightful rumours from the British mandate territory and elements of 
European antisemitism, and forms of struggle such as the “boycott of Jews” adapted from Germany’ (Küntzel, 
60). 
  57 
notes: ‘In Quṭb’s fantasyland, not only is everything Jewish evil, but everything evil is Jewish.’308 The evil 
West was now understood by Quṭb as inherently Jewish.  
Quṭb proclaims in Our Struggle with the Jews that Jews were leading the Muslim Community away from 
their religion. He believed that Jews were the ones who had produced the modernity that he despised 
so much, and which was so antithetical to Islam. Quṭb describes several modern Western ideologies 
that were transported to Muslim lands and whose creators – Marx, Freud and Durkheim – were Jews.  
He rightfully understands that these ideologies in the West had appeared ‘in a context of religious and 
traditional decline in the West’,309 and he now sees the same process taking place in the Islamic world. 
For him, it is a proof of the Jewish role in the universal immorality that had been brought in the Abode 
of Islam by a Jewish campaign against Islam.310 He writes: 
Behind the doctrine of atheistic materialism was a Jew; behind the doctrine of animalistic sexuality was 
a Jew; and behind the destruction of the family and the shattering of sacred relationships in society was 
a Jew.311 
Thus the West was equated with ‘the evil face of the Jews’. In order to understand why, we must turn 
to the Islamic scriptures, because Islamists, who take these sources literally, consider them to be the 
only sources of knowledge. No Islamist, including Quṭb, therefore doubts ‘that the statement in the 
Qur’ān that Allah changed Jews into apes and pigs is to be taken literally, since the Qur’ān is no more or 
less than the truth itself.’312 Islamists quote the passages in the Qur’ān that are negative about Jews 
regularly, i.e. Jews are arrogant, perfidious, selfish, avaricious, obstinate, fraudulent, domineering, and 
bloodsucking. The example of the Prophet, who after many disputations (for the Jews rejected 
Muḥammad as a prophet) defeated the Jews of Medina, is commonly cited.313 Quṭb for example notes:  
The Children of Israel were the first ones who confronted the Islamic preaching with enmity, treachery 
and war in Medina and in the whole of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus the Jews were enemies of the Muslim 
Community from the first day.314  
Although the struggle with Jews in Islamic scriptures is minor, for Quṭb and other Islamists, 
‘Muḥammad’s conflict with the Jews was portrayed as a central theme in his career’315 as this struggle 
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served as a model for the policy against Israel. We see that Quṭb’s attitude towards Jews became 
increasingly harsh in the time of the Arab Revolts in 1936-1939, and turned even more violent when he 
heard the news about the declaration of the State of Israel (in Quṭb’s eyes a colonizer of Islamic land) 
during his stay in the United States.316 For him, Jews, Israelis and Zionists were interchangeable terms. 
Whereas the Muslims of seventh-century Arabia had won their struggle against the weak and cowardly 
Jews, now the Muslims clearly had lost, and in a very humiliating way: land that had been part of the 
Abode of Islam for centuries was now handed to Jews – a traumatic experience. Quṭb saw how the holy 
narrative, God’s Truth, was turned around: masters had become slaves, and slaves had become 
masters.317 The conflict between Israel and Palestine for Quṭb and other Islamists became a ‘trans-
historical symbol of evil.’318 In other words: Quṭb believed the Islamic past lives eternally as the pattern 
for the present.319 The situation in the here and now proved to him that the struggle of Muslims and 
Jews in seventh century Arabia is an eternal, cosmic struggle, that is now, as it was then, very much 
alive. Quṭb writes: 
The Jews have confronted Islam with enmity from the moment that the Islamic state was established in 
Medina. They plotted against the Muslim Community from the first day it became a community. (…) This 
is a war which has not been extinguished, even for one moment, for close on fourteen centuries, and 
which continues until this moment, its blaze raging in all corners of the earth.320 
Everyone, Muslims included, who participated in processes of Westernization, was to be considered a 
traitor in this struggle by Quṭb. He called them ‘agents of the Jews’ and ‘brown British’. Quṭb writes that 
the most prominent modern form of the Jewish deception was to be found in the new, modern classes 
of deceivers: the intelligentsia.321 ‘Behind their façade of Muslim identity’, according to Quṭb, ‘lurked 
their true Jewish nature.’322 Although Sayyid Quṭb doesn’t mention any names in Our Struggle with the 
Jews, it is clear to me that he addresses Ṭāhā Ḥusayn amongst others at this point. He writes:  
Indeed, this antagonistic force threatening the Islamic world today has a massive army of agents in the 
form of professors, philosophers, doctors, and researchers – sometimes also writers, poets, scientists 
and journalists – carrying Muslim names because they are of Muslim descent. (…) This army of ‘learned 
authorities’ intends to break the Creed of the Muslims in all ways. (…) With this and that, they fulfil the 
ancient role of the Jews. Nothing has changed except the form and the framework of that ancient Jewish 
role.323 
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Response to Nazism 
Having explored his attitude towards Jews, it is now time to turn to Quṭb’s view on Nazism. Just as Quṭb’s 
attitude towards Jews changed and sharpened over time, his response to Nazism likewise evolved.  
At first, Sayyid Quṭb responded very negatively to the Second World War and Nazism. We know for 
example that Quṭb was dismayed at the ferocity of the war, which ‘harmed all of the earth’s nations’, 
and especially at the actions of the Germans which he considered ‘monstrous’.324 Europe’s Holocaust, 
concentration camps and fire bombings, which were revealed in Egypt through the media, he 
considered barbaric.325 The Nazi war was another proof for Quṭb that the West didn’t have anything 
good to offer.326 
Later on, however, Quṭb’s attitude toward the Nazis shifted. This new vision has everything to do with 
Quṭb’s abovementioned belief in Allah’s divine order which was turned upside down by Jews: masters 
(Muslims) had become slaves, and slaves (dhimmi Jews) had become masters.  
Was this then the end of Islam? No: Quṭb believed that the story would not end here and that Allah 
would set the order aright: He would put the Jews in their place, turn them into slaves again and punish 
them for their evil-doing. This Allah had done whenever the Jews turned the divine order upside down: 
He had destroyed the Jewish Temples in Israel, and in later times He had sent servants to punish the 
Jews. Quṭb reassured his readers that now too the Jews would be punished, if only his readers return to 
Holy Scripture, where they would be strengthened in their struggle against the Jews, and where they 
are taught how to participate properly in the punishing of the Jews. He remarks: 
Allah said about the Jews: ‘You shall do evil in the earth twice and you shall thereby ride very high. Then 
when the promise of the first of these came to pass, we sent against you Our servants, men of great 
strength who roamed round the dwellings.’ And this was a promise fulfilled. The first time may be 
explained as follows: They rode high in the Holy Land. They had power and sovereignty there. Then they 
did evil in the Land. Consequently, Allah sent against them His servants who possessed great strength, 
courage and power. (…) The story of Jewish evil-doing was repeated; as were Jewish humiliation and 
expulsion as punishment for this evil-doing. Whenever the Children of Israel reverted to evil-doing in the 
Land, punishment awaited them. The Sunnah is resolute here: ‘If you return, then We return’. And the 
Jews did indeed return to evil-doing, so Allah gave to the Muslims power over them. The Muslims then 
expelled them from the whole of the Arabian Peninsula. Then the Jews again returned to evil-doing and 
consequently Allah sent against them others of His servants, until the modern period. Then Allah brought 
Hitler to rule over them (it. AJ) And once again today the Jews have returned to evil-doing, in the form of 
‘Israel’ which made the Arabs, the owners of the Land, taste of sorrows and woe. So let Allah bring down 
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upon the Jews people who will mete out to them the worst kind of punishment, as a confirmation of His 
unequivocal promise: ‘If you return, then We return’; and in keeping with His Sunna, which does not vary. 
So for one who expects tomorrow, it is close!327 
At first Quṭb responded very negatively to the Nazis whose deeds were considered to be monstrous and 
barbaric. Later on, his view changed. Although Hitler was part of the jāhilī world, Quṭb saw him as a 
servant of Allah, who put the Jews in their place after their continuous evil-doing: the Nazis have 
humiliated and punished the Jews and have thus restored the right order. They managed this however 
only for a short moment of time; the Jews have now once again returned to evil-doing as the State of 
Israel proves, and another punishment is required. 
Although it goes beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the exact ways the Nazis have influenced 
Islamist thinkers, it is not hard to see National-Socialist influences in Quṭb’s words. Jeffrey Herf in Nazi 
Propaganda for the Arab World explains how, during the Second World War in Egypt, one could hear 
Nazi broadcasts in Arabic, wherein modern German anti-Semitism was fused with anti-Jewish themes 
extracted from Islamic traditions. He suggests that Nazi ideology found an echo in Quṭb:328 not only do 
the titles Our Struggle with the Jews and Hitler’s Mein Kampf show much resemblance; Quṭb’s views of 
the Jews and his ‘conspiratorial mode of analysis’ also display a ‘striking continuity with the themes of 
Nazism’s wartime broadcasts, with the important difference that it was far more embedded in the 
Qur’ān and Islamic commentaries.’329 Herf mentions that the Nazis claimed that world Jewry was 
planning on destroying Germany, whereas Quṭb believed that the Jews wanted to destroy Islam. 
Whereas the Nazis claimed that Jews were undermining the values of the community, Quṭb believed 
that Jews spread confusion about religious beliefs and undermined Islamic values. Whereas the Nazis 
saw the answer in a secular prophet (Hitler), Quṭb believed in the unshakable authority of Holy 
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Scripture.330 And just as the Nazis had threatened the Jews with punishment for their wrongdoing, so 
Quṭb urged the punishment and humiliation of the Jews.331 
Thus not only did Quṭb assign the Nazis a role in Islamic salvation history as servants of God who put the 
Jews in their place and restored – albeit for a short while – the divine hierarchy. Quṭb also made 
extensive use of the European anti-Semitism that the Nazis themselves transported to Egypt during the 
war. 
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Conclusion: making Egypt great again 
This thesis started with Eran Shakine’s drawing bearing the title A Muslim, a Christian and a Jew in the 
tunnel of love. In the introduction I wondered whether it is possible to figuratively discern Ṭāhā Ḥusayn 
and Sayyid Quṭb in this drawing. During the Egyptian monarchy, which lasted from 1919 until 1952, can 
we legitimately ascribe to them the role of ‘a Muslim’ in the tunnel of Abrahamitic love, walking side by 
side with their Jewish companions? Did they continue walking next to them when the darkness of the 
Holocaust fell on them? Did Ḥusayn and Sayyid Quṭb light their path in the tunnel of love, and if yes: 
how? Or did their tunnel vision prevent them from finding and entering the tunnel? In a less 
metaphorical and clearer language, my research question was: What position on Nazism did Egyptian 
nationalist intellectuals Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and Sayyid Quṭb occupy? 
The first step in answering this question was to explore the historical context of the Egyptian monarchy, 
which started after Egypt’s first Revolution in 1919, and ended after the second in 1952. We discovered 
that the period under discussion was eventful, to say the least. In 1914 Egypt had become a British 
protectorate, after decades of being a British ‘Veiled Protectorate’ under official Ottoman rule. The 
following decades I described as an ever-stronger struggle for independence. And if that was not 
enough, during the time of the monarchy, Egypt witnessed the Great Depression and two world wars, 
which had direct negative economic, political and social consequences. Additionally, Egypt had become 
involved in the Palestine problem from 1936 onwards: solidarity with Palestine was felt, and the Israel-
Palestine conflict was experienced as a deep national concern. In 1948 the Jewish State had been 
declared and Egypt, together with other Arab nations, entered into a war that was subsequently 
dramatically lost by the Arabs. As a consequence, Muslim-Jewish relations in Egypt deteriorated from 
the thirties onwards. 
We have seen above how this situation provoked strong nationalist sentiments. We have furthermore 
explored how these sentiments changed in tenor over the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. The twenties in 
Egypt were relatively prosperous. The class of effendiyya, educated in Westernized educational systems, 
proclaimed a nationalism that was territorially based. They longed for a reconstruction of Egypt on a 
Western model: liberalism, secularism, science and nation-state were key terms in their redefinition of 
Egypt. Westernization was the way to go, for it was believed that Egypt and the West were linked by a 
natural bond of shared history, i.e. the times of the pharaohs, the Greeks and the Romans. In the 
following decades however, it was felt that relations with Britain had come to a breaking point. A 
widespread mood of disillusionment had set in. Due to the educational developments, a new nationally 
involved class came into being, i.e. the ‘new’ effendiyya’. This group didn’t believe in processes of 
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westernization and modernization to ‘make Egypt great again’. Instead the new effendiyya had their 
mind set on nationalism that could be called ‘supra-Egyptian’: a form of nationalism that stretched 
beyond the borders of Egypt. A concentration on Islam and Arabness would make the whole Arab world 
great again, although Egypt was often granted a leading role in supra-Egyptianism.  
As for Egypt’s response to Nazism, we learnt that two narratives have been circulating amongst 
historians in both the past and the present: a ‘pro-Axis!’ and a ‘pro-Axis?’ story. In the first narrative the 
majority of Egyptians are described as having welcomed and rejoiced in Nazi ideology; in the second 
counternarrative most Egyptians seem to have rejected Nazism point blank. According to Israel 
Gershoni, the ‘pro-Axis?’ narrative is the one that actually took place in Egypt during the Second World 
War: there was much more resistance to Nazism during the thirties and forties than jubilation. 
After this exploration of the tumultuous times of the Egyptian monarchy and the question whether or 
not Nazism was welcomed in Egypt, it was time to explore what Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and Sayyid Quṭb had to 
say on these issues: in chapters two and three I submitted their respective writings as well as relevant 
secondary literature to careful examination.  
Ṭāhā Ḥusayn (1889-1973) was a typical, famous and controversial territorial nationalist, with a few 
supra-Egyptian tendencies, we concluded above. Born in the Egyptian village but struggling with his 
traditional background, he felt an attraction to the West. He ‘crossed the canal’ as an adolescent, 
becoming a student at the secular Cairo University, and later at several universities in France. There he 
fell in love: not only with his future wife, but also with the West in general. He believed that Egypt should 
have a sense of pride because of her rich past and her Greek roots that she shares with the West, and 
because of her Arab language and literature. Egypt shouldn’t therefore be dominated by any colonial 
power, but has the right of full independence from her foreign occupier (as does Palestine, according 
to Ḥusayn). But Egypt can only become great again when she follows the European example.  
Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966) belonged to the group of new effendiyya, and we discovered that his 
nationalism was dotted with Islamic supra-Egyptianism. In his early as well as his later writings a strong 
concern for social justice becomes manifest. His solution for all of Egypt’s (and wider: the Arab world’s) 
problems, was certainly not Westernization. Egypt is not part of the West, but has an Eastern identity, 
with Islam as a primary identity marker. Especially after his return from the United States, he figuratively 
moved back to his villag, to tradition and to Islam. There was the only solution for Egypt’s identity crisis 
to be found: Eastern, Islamic revival would reconstruct the Arab world for the better. Muslims don’t 
need the West, and therefore shouldn’t be colonized by it. This view became increasingly radical as Quṭb 
grew older, to the point that he believed that the whole of the West and even parts of the Muslim world 
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were jāhilī (i.e. barbaric), wanting to destroy the spirit of Islam. In the fifties and sixties, Quṭb came to 
believe that the West was inherently Jewish. Influenced by (a selective reading of) Islam’s Holy 
Scriptures and prompted by current events (the colonizing of the Arab world, and Palestine in 
particular), he believed that Jews were the ones that had produced modernity (Marx, Freud, Durkheim) 
and were set on destroying Islam. Quṭb proclaimed that the jāhilī forces have to be brought down, if 
need be with violence, for the Muslim world to be liberated and Allah’s divine order to return.  
In many respects, the two intellectuals under discussion resemble each other. Both Ḥusayn and Quṭb 
were ‘children from the village’, who enjoyed ‘an Egyptian childhood’, who developed into effendis and 
wrote about their youth. For both redefining Egypt’s identity was a priority: Ḥusayn and Quṭb both 
promised their readers liberation from current Egyptian turmoil, and both found that this liberation was 
to be gained through education. Finally, both had strong opinions as to the role the West in the future 
of culture in Egypt, and the Arab world.  
However, Ḥusayn and Quṭb have more frequently proven to be each other’s opposites than allies. 
Although both were nationalists, in their nationalism they were diametrically opposed: whereas Ḥusayn 
was a territorialist nationalist, wanting to liberate Egypt from her ‘jāhilīyya’ by imitating the West, Quṭb 
was an Islamic supra-Egyptianist, wanting to liberate Egypt from the jāhilī West by way of Islamic revival. 
Although both saw the solution in education, Ḥusayn found that Western, modern education was the 
future, and Quṭb believed that this type of education was a Western means to spread jāhilīyya and hate 
for Islam; proper knowledge of the Qur’ān was to be taught as a weapon against this evil force.  
Another area upon which the intellectuals under discussion didn’t agree was their response to Nazism. 
One could assume that Ḥusayn, who left behind Eastern traditionalism and embraced and admired 
Western modernism, was an admirer of Hitler and Nazism, whose origins are of the West. Nothing is 
less true: ‘not every sulṭān is for me an amīr’, Ḥusayn wrote in A Passage to France. He stated that there 
are ‘European evils’, which shouldn’t be adopted by Egypt. The West isn’t always synonymous with 
modernity, and is not always a model to emulate: not everything European should be admired. 
According to Ḥusayn, German totalitarianism should be fully condemned. A neutral stance is not 
possible.  
In Ḥusayn’s writings this strong condemnation of the Holocaust and Nazi ideology becomes visible. In 
his travel log From Cairo to Beirut, published in 1946 – directly after the Second World War and in the 
midst of the Palestine problem and the deterioration of Muslim-Jewish relations – we have read how 
Ḥusayn describes Jews as victims of a horrible, unjust war and their fate in the hands of the Nazis as 
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horrific. Although in this log he indicates that he doesn’t agree with the consequences of Zionism in 
Palestine, without a doubt Ḥusayn shows an empathetic attitude towards the Jews and the Holocaust. 
Moreover, in his review of Rauschning’s Hitler Told Me an even stronger condemnation of German 
totalitarianism is found, as early as 1940. In  this review Ḥusayn writes that if Germany would achieve 
world domination, the consequences would be devastating: thousands of atrocities would take place, 
one would suffer hunger and death, millions would be killed and one’s individuality would be wiped out. 
Ḥusayn rejects Hitler and his Nazi ideas point blank, for Hitler has a conscience that is dripping with 
blood. In conclusion, it is clear that Ḥusayn took part in the ‘pro-Axis?’ counternarrative: not every 
Egyptian rejoiced in Nazi totalitarianism. 
Here, I want to go one step further. While examining both Ḥusayn’s nationalism and his response to 
Nazism, I discovered a connection between the two. He condemned the Nazis because of his embrace 
of the West. Because he admired Western values as liberty, equality and democracy and wanted Egypt 
to absorb them, he rejected the Nazis who, although of Western origin, oppose these values and thereby 
show their barbarism. Enlightened humanity which with Ḥusayn was acquainted thanks to the West, 
had become a driving force behind his rejection of National-Socialism. Moreover, Ḥusayn urges others 
to fight the Nazis with him so that Western civilization based on enlightened humanity can be restored 
intact.  
As for Sayyid Quṭb, I discovered a similar line of thought. We concluded that Quṭb was a strong opponent 
of the jāhilī West. Therefore one could expect that he would reject Hitler, who was part of this barbaric 
West. Again, this is not what happened. Whereas Ḥusayn saw in the Nazis an exception to the good that 
is to be found in the admirable West, Quṭb saw in the Nazis an exception from all Western jāhilī matters 
to be rejected.  
This became clear in his work Our Struggle with the Jews. Since Quṭb believed that the jāhilī West was 
inherently Jewish, the Nazis, who ‘put the Jews in their place’ were the ones that fought this jāhilī order 
and were doing God’s work. In Quṭb’s eyes, the Nazis were servants of God, who rightfully punished the 
Jews for their evil-doing. Furthermore, it became manifest that Quṭb made use of Nazi language brought 
to Egypt by Nazi propaganda broadcasts. We saw how Nazi theology and Nazi expressions found an 
echo in Sayyid Quṭb’s thought.  
Quṭb occupied himself with a reconstruction of Egypt and the larger East. John Calvert describes how 
he attempted to build a new sense of community, for which he and many others were desperately 
longing. Whereas Quṭb ‘only’ differentiated between ‘the Eastern Self’ and ‘the Western Other’, in the 
fifties and sixties religion became the dividing agent: ‘the Self’ on the one hand was Islam and God’s 
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final Truth; ‘the Other’ was the jāhilīyya world.332 In Our Struggle with the Jews I discovered a 
reinforcement of this line of thought. In this work, Quṭb saw in the Jews the ultimate ‘Other’: they were 
regarded as the sources of all evil in the world, and the anti-Islamic power that needed to be brought 
down.  
Our Struggle with the Jews should be read in the light of Quṭb’s nationalism – his attempt to reinvent, 
reconstruct and redefine Egypt. When the text is placed in this context and one is not distracted by the 
violent and condemnable words uttered in this work, we understand how Quṭb built, or fortified, the 
Muslim community. For one, Quṭb set clear boundaries in his pamphlet: he harshly distances the ‘Self’ 
(the true Muslims) form the ‘Other’ (the Jewish West). By creating this enemy of pure evil, the sense of 
community, belonging and interconnectedness within the community is reinforced. Furthermore, he 
connects this community both to the past and the future by linking it to a holy narrative: the struggle 
between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ is the same struggle of the holy past. In the future however, the ‘Self’ 
(the good Muslims) will prevail: a holy vision. This holy narrative creates a sense of hope, self-confidence 
and pride, which increasingly raises the spirits of the community. It is a strategic way of making Egypt 
and the East great again (although it has become clear that it wasn’t only a strategy; Quṭb truly believed 
his constructed view of the Jews). 
We discovered that Ḥusayn participates in the ‘pro-Axis?’ story and that Quṭb is involved in the ‘pro-
Axis!’ narrative. Both effendis were not alone in their opinions. My comparison of Ḥusayn’s and Quṭb’s 
response to Nazism indicates that both stories actually took place in Egypt: there were effendi like Quṭb 
who rejoiced in Nazi ideology, and there were effendi like Ḥusayn who rejected it fiercely. For further 
research it would be very interesting to elaborate upon the many more examples of the ‘pro-Axis?’ 
counternarrative, since the pro-Nazi voices of the time are well-known. Only then will a truthful account 
of what actually happened regarding the response to Nazism during the Second World War be brought 
to light. Only then can the traditional ‘pro-Axis!’ narrative be legitimately adjusted.  
Lastly, this thesis proves that – at least in the case of Ḥusayn and Quṭb – a connection between views 
on nationalism and dealings with Nazism exists. I leave it to future researchers to point out whether this 
was also the case for other nationalist intellectuals living in the period between the Egyptian revolutions. 
In conclusion, can we discern Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and Sayyid Quṭb in the drawing of Shakine? Are they walking 
next to their Jewish companion in the tunnel of love, even when the darkness of the Holocaust is 
spreading? Do they shine their lights to help them find their way?  
                                                             
332 Calvert, Origins of Radical Islamism, 170. 
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It is clear that Ḥusayn can be detected. Although in reality he was not able to see due to his blindness, 
it is evident that the Arabic proverb in his case proves to be true: ‘blind eyes see better than blind 
hearts’. Ḥusayn was inspired by Western values of equality and fraternity. Therefore he metaphorically 
offered his Jewish brother his arm in the tunnel of love and kindled a fire, so that the Jew was not 
swallowed by Nazi darkness, and the world would realize that this darkness should not prevail. Quṭb on 
the other hand was increasingly blinded by hatred for the outside world. As a ‘foreigner in the world’, 
he was not able to find the tunnel of love, nor to see ‘the Jew’ as his brother. Quṭb, in his attempt to 
reinforce the Muslim Community, needed the Jew to function symbollicaly as evil, whereby it was 
necessary to ignore or even deny his humanity. Discovering the Jew as a human being in the tunnel of 
love would undermine this attempt and would only be considered a ‘struggle’. 
I dedicate the final words of this thesis to Sayyid Quṭb, whose Qur’ān interpretation in Social Justice I 
quote:  
“O ye who have believed, let not one people mock another, who are possibly better than themselves. (…) Do not 
scoff at one another, or shame one another with nicknames; it is bad to get the name of evil conduct when you 
are a Believer; and those who do not repent are evil-doers.” The complete and far-reaching point of the verse is: 
“Do not scoff at one another.” For when a man scoffs at his neighbour he scoffs at himself, for all men come of 
one soul.’333  
It is my hope that every violent, present-day tunnel vision will be transformed into a tunnel of love, and 
that in the end, all will see the light – 
‘for all men come of one soul’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
333 Quṭb, Social Justice, 54, 55 (Qur’ān 49:11). 
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